Interrogating Britain in Yemen: humanitarianism & counterterrorism in the (inter)national interest? by Sarwar, Saif
1 
 
 
Interrogating Britain in Yemen: humanitarianism & counterterrorism in the 
(inter)national interest? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MA International Relations 
Word Count: 16,480 
Supervisor: Vineet Thakur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the British government’s discursive and                                 
practical involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s ‘Operation Restoring Hope’, in Yemen. To do so, it                             
pursues three central arguments. First, using the de-classified governmental record, it is argued that                           
Anglo-Yemeni relations can be characterised by two interlinked political-economic objectives rooted in                       
colonial governance. Namely, the objectives to shape a political environment favourable for British                         
commercial enterprise​. ​Second, it ​is argued that officials employ two interwoven discourses which                         
represent the government’s involvement in terms of solving a humanitarian crisis and countering                         
terrorism. Using a critical discourse analysis, this section will draw upon ​statements from leading officials                             
and will analyse the ways in which the government represents its involvement in Yemen. ​Here, it is shown                                   
that officials cast Britain as a humanitarian actor in a conflict between good and evil. Further, it is argued                                     
that these discursive choices accompany and legitimate the performance of practices (i.e. blockade and                           
aerial bombing) which are largely responsible for the humanitarian crisis and structural violence to which                             
the government is responding. Finally, ​it is argued that the government’s discourse and practices rely on                               
an unsupported appeal to the national interest. Rather, Britain’s involvement in Yemen is more clearly                             
understood as a part of a wider form of governance under which the prosperity and security of an elite                                     
constituency is prioritised over that of the wider population.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the British government’s discursive and                                 
practical involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s military operation in Yemen. Centrally, it will describe                           
1
and critically analyse the discourses and accompanying practices that form the government’s support for                           
‘Operation Restoring Hope’. To this end, it will unpack the discursive context in which the government’s                               
practical support is conducted in the ‘national interest’. In so doing, it finds that Britain’s involvement in                                 
Yemen is more clearly understood as a part of a broader form of governance, under which the prosperity                                   
and security of an elite constituency is prioritised over that of the wider population.  
In each year of the last century, the British government has been engaged in either a covert or                                   
overt military intervention. Under the auspices of the national interest, many of these engagements have                             
centred on territories in the Middle East - under which lies a ‘vital prize for any power interested in world                                       
influence or domination’. In recent years, British arms exports to allies in the resource-rich region have                               
2
reached unprecedented levels. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which lead the operation in Yemen, are the                               
principal recipients of British arms. Between July and September 2015, Saudi Arabia received £2.8bn                           
worth of British-manufactured combat aircraft, bombs, rockets, and missiles. In relative terms, this is                           
equivalent to the world’s total authorised arms exports in the four-and-a-half years from January 2011 to                               
June 2015. As such, Britain occupies a central role in the military campaign in Yemen (2015-ongoing).                               
3
Indeed, the coalition’s naval blockade and aerial bombardment hinges on the support of the UK and US                                 
government. Since the campaign’s outset, UK support involved providing military personnel in the Saudi                           
4
command chain to assist British-built aircraft to release British-made bombs. Of all involved parties, the                             
5
1 The military intervention led by Saudi Arabia (between 2015-2017) involved fighter jets and/or ground forces from: United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal, Sudan, and Academi (formerly known as Blackwater). 
To support the coalition, the United States (Army and Navy) and the United Kingdom provided increased arms sales, training, 
logistical and intelligence support, assistance with the naval blockade, and military personnel to assist in the command chain for 
aerial bombing. In this period, other supporting governments included: Australia, Canada, Spain, Brazil, Finland, France, and 
Germany. 
2 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Planning Document, 1947, cited in Mark Curtis, ‘Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the 
World’, pp.15-16, (Vintage: 2003). 
3 The UK Working Group on Arms (UKY 0012), ‘Submission into the Committee on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) inquiry 
into the use of UK-manufactured arms in the conflict in Yemen,’ p.4, 2016. Available online at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/committees-on-arms-export-controls/us
e-of-ukmanufactured-arms-in-yemen/written/31177.pdf​; House of Commons, ‘The use of UK-manufactured arms in Yemen’, 
First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation, and Skills and International Development Committees of Session 2016-17​. 2016. Available online 
at: ​https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/679/679.pdf  
4 Brookings Institute, ‘Sen. Murphy on revisiting U.S.-Saudi relationship’, 2016. Former CIA officer and Brookings Institute 
fellow Bruce Riedel notes, ‘if the US and UK, tonight, told Saudi Arabia, ‘this war has to end’, it would end tomorrow. The Royal 
Saudi Air Force cannot operate without American and British support.’ 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/04/22/watch-sen-chris-murphy-on-revisiting-u-s-saudi-relationship ​.  
5 The Guardian, ‘British and US military in command room for Saudi strikes on Yemen’, 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/15/british-us-military-in-command-room-saudi-strikes-yemen?CMP=share_btn
_tw 
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coalition’s aerial bombing campaign has caused the highest number of civilian fatalities. Between 2016                           
and 2018, there were an estimated sixty-thousand conflict-related fatalities. Beyond the fatalities from                         
6
air-strikes, the coalition’s blockade has directly created widespread famine and disease. In 2017, over                           
7
eighty per-cent of the population was in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. As a result of the                                     
blockade and the targeted strikes on civilian infrastructure, fifty thousand children died from starvation                           
and access to healthcare was denied to thousands affected by treatable diseases. That the operation has                               
8
culminated in these conditions and has allegedly committed international (war) crimes demands scrutiny                         
9
of the UK government’s sustained involvement. 
As such, this thesis will interrogate the discourses and practices underlying the conduct of the                             
British government’s involvement in Yemen. To do so, it will address the following research questions.                             
First, what are the objectives on which current Anlgo-Yemeni relations are based? Second, how do these                               
objectives further our understanding of Britain’s involvement? Third, in what ways is the government’s                           
involvement represented by leading officials? The final chapter will problematise the government’s                       
overarching objective to serve the national interest via improving international security and prosperity. It                           
will ask, in whose interests does the governance of the Yemen operate? 
At the centre of the analysis is the question of the discursive representation of Britain’s                             
involvement. To address this, the thesis will employ a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine public                               
speeches, parliamentary statements, and interviews relating to Yemen from senior officials in Her                         
Majesty’s Government (2011-2017). While the operation started in 2015, the analysis will draw upon                           
statements in the four years prior, in order to provide a fuller picture of the government’s posture                                 
towards Yemen. Between January 1​st 2011 and December 31​st 2017, ‘Yemen’ featured 497 times across all                               
departments through all announcement types (statements, speeches, press releases, government                   
responses, gov.uk news updates). To analyse a representative sample, one hundred of these statements                           
10
from a diversity of senior officials was examined. Thematically, these statements all related to either a                               
humanitarian crisis and/or the problem of terrorism in the Yemeni context. While a number of                             
6 Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), ‘Yemen Death Toll Now Exceeds 60,000’, 2018. Of this figure, 
6,480 were a result of direct civilian targeting (not including collateral civilian fatalities. Available online at: 
https://www.acleddata.com/2018/12/11/press-release-yemen-war-death-toll-now-exceeds-60000-according-to-latest-acled-data
/#_ftn1  
7 The Guardian, ‘Saudi-led naval blockade leaves 20m Yemenis facing humanitarian disaster’. 2015. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/saudi-led-naval-blockade-worsens-yemen-humanitarian-disaster  
8 The Guardian, ‘Bombed into famine: how Saudi air campaign targets Yemen’s food supplies’. 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/12/bombed-into-famine-how-saudi-air-campaign-targets-yemens-food-supplies
; United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), ‘Humanitarian Bulletin: Yemen’, Issue 24, 
pp.1-5, 2017; The Guardian, ‘Saudis must lift blockade or untold thousands will die, UN agencies warn.’ 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/16/lift-yemen-blockade-to-save-children-un-agencies-tell-saudis  
9 The Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen, ‘Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, including 
violations and abuses since September 2014’, ​United Nations Human Rights Council ​. 2018. Available online at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E 
10 Gov.uk, ‘Announcements’, 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements?keywords=yemen&taxons%5B%5D=all&subtaxons%5B%5D=all&announc
ement_filter_option=all&departments%5B%5D=all&people%5B%5D=all&world_locations%5B%5D=all&from_date=&to_da
te=31%2F12%2F2017  
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statements contained claims relating to both themes, for analytical purposes the statements will be prized                             
apart into the discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism.  
This thesis employs the concept of discourse drawn from Edward Said, with a particular focus on                               
Richard Jackson’s work on the discourse of counterterrorism. Under such a view, discourse is about                             
11
both ‘the production of knowledge through language’ and through practice. It is a systematised network                             
12
of statements and a manner of speaking which structures sets of (government and non-governmental)                           
practices, and as such governs our understanding of them in terms of legitimacy and normality. ​As Stuart                                 
Hall puts it, ‘discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of                                 
practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about,                               
forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in                               
society’. Crucially, political realities are co-constituted by a discursive project alongside a set of                           
13
institutional practices. As such, this thesis will provide a deeper understanding of Britain’s involvement                           
14
in Yemen by unpacking its discourses and accompanying (discursive) practices.   
 
Methodology & theoretical commitments 
Drawing upon the tradition of critical discourse analysis (CDA), this thesis will describe and analyse the                               
discourse used by leading government officials about the UK’s involvement in Yemen. According to Ruth                             
Wodak, CDA is a multidisciplinary research programme that does not provide a specific theory or                             
methodological approach. Rather, researchers using CDA may draw upon a range of theoretical and                           
15
methodological frameworks. Specifically, this thesis will use Richard Jackson’s discourse-analytical                   
approach to public language on counterterrorism. This approach holds that ‘discourse analysis is a form                             
of critical theorising which aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and                             
social and political processes.’ In so doing, it provides a deeper understanding of the material and                               
16
political consequences of a dominant system of representation. Considered alongside the performance of                         
governmental practices, employing a CDA will help to show how a specific mode of representation                             
legitimates and makes possible a certain material reality. In so doing, it will aim to advance an                                 
understanding of the construction of the discursive context which makes the performance of violence                           
possible.  
 
11 Edward Said, ‘Orientalism’, (Vintage Books: 1979); Richard Jackson, ‘Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and 
Counter-terrorism.’ (Manchester University Press: 2005). 
12 Stuart Hall (Ed.), ‘Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices’, p.44 (London: Sage. 1997).  
13 Hall (Ed.), p.6, 1997.   
14 Richard Jackson, ‘Language, Power and Politics: Critical Discourse Analysis and the War on Terrorism.’, p.1, ​49​th ​Parallel. ​2014.  
15 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. ‘Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis’. (Sage: 2001). 
16 Richard Jackson, ‘The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics, and Terrorism Studies’, pp.2-3. 2008.  
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Methodology 
This study’s approach to CDA involves subjecting a range of texts to a set of analytical questions. The                                   
discourse analysis will be operationalised according to the following systematic line of critical questioning                           
outlined by Jackson :  
17
1. ‘What assumptions, beliefs and values underlie the language in the text?  
2. How does the grammar, syntax and sentence construction reinforce the meanings and effects of                           
the discursive constructions contained in the text?  
3. What are the histories and embedded meanings of the important words in the text?  
4. What patterns can be observed in the language, and how do different parts of the text relate to                                   
each other?  
5. What knowledge or practices are normalised by the language in the text? 
6. How does the language create, reinforce or challenge power relations in society?’ 
 
Each question will inform the discourse analysis in chapter three. Question six, however, will be drawn                               
upon in chapter four chapter to address the final two research questions. This will involve evaluating and                                 
rejecting the appeal to the national interest, which will be shown to be maintained by the discourses                                 
analysed in chapter three.  
 
Theoretical commitments 
The study will maintain three central theoretical commitments.  
The first is a commitment to understanding discourses as systems of signification. Language and                           
18
narrative are interwoven with cognition. As for discourse, by helping to produce knowledge about                           
particular topics it also helps to construct and signify social practices, or our view of things in the material                                     
world. In this way, it gives meaning to complex patterns of practices. In traditional approaches to IR and                                   
terrorism scholarship, a general criticism of this position is that ‘language isn’t everything’. However, this                             
19
betrays a misunderstanding of the relationship between discourses and ‘knowing’ a complex and                         
non-neutral phenomenon, such as the ‘orient’, or ‘terrorism’. This commitment does not take the view                             
that reality is entirely contingent on language. Rather, it holds that the certain discourses used by                               
dominant centres of government and corporate power (consciously and unconsciously) signify a specific                         
representation of their practices. As chapter three will show, for example, the ‘world’s worst man-made                             
17 Richard Jackson, ‘Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism’, p.25 (Manchester University 
Press: 2005).  
18 Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’. ​European Journal of 
International Relations​, vol.​ ​5, no.2, p. 229, 1999.  
19 Milliken, p.230, 1999. 
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famine’ is represented as a natural disaster; rather than the product of an explicit social policy of the                                   
20
coalition allegedly responding to a humanitarian crisis.   
While narratives are central to the process of signification, they often oversimplify a complex                           
social world. The socio-cultural ubiquity of meta-narratives relating to ‘good versus evil’ or ‘barbarism and                             
civilisation’ are prime examples. However, this manner of speaking is neither as neutral nor objective as                               
21
it purports to be. As such, the discourse analysis will highlight the ways in which narratives are employed                                   
to provide meaning to the UK government’s involvement in Yemen. This commitment paves the way to                               
showing how violence is made possible and performable. 
The second commitment is to discourse performativity. As Milliken puts it, this treats ‘discourses                           
as being (re)productive of things defined by the discourse.’ This means that discourses help to produce                                 
22
systems of knowledge which support and legitimate the performance of specific practices. With meaning                           
established via discourse, practices are normalised. As a result, certain interventions are rendered logical                           
and intelligible. In Gramscian terms, practices become ‘common sense’. As such, there is an important                             
23
performative aspect to the discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism. Used in the discourse                         
analysis (Chapter 3.1 and 3.2), this commitment will help to provide insights into how certain practices are                                 
produced as common-sense (e.g. providing aid to civilians while simultaneously supporting air-strikes on                         
civilian infrastructure). It will help to cast light on how the performance of practices which deteriorate                               
humanitarian conditions and further embed violence into the Yemeni context sharply contradict the                         
discourses in which they are addressed.  
The third commitment is to an understanding of discourse as dominant yet inherently unstable.                           
As Milliken puts it, ‘if discourses are grids of intelligibility for large numbers of people, all discourses are                                   
unstable grids, requiring work to (re)articulate their knowledge, making discourses changeable and in fact                           
historically contingent’. While they are unstable grids, all discourses are not equal. For two reasons, it is                                 
24
valuable to determine how some are more dominant and stable than others. First, an understanding of                               
discursive dominance helps to grasp more fully the power and impact a discourse holds on the world                                 
through actual practice. As Didier Bigo argues, it is sets of practices, not merely discourse, that impact the                                   
governance of individuals and changes the world. In this sense, the dominance of a discourse relies on                                 
25
20 UN News, ‘Yemen: UN chief hails ‘signs of hope’ in world’s worst man-made humanitarian disaster.’ 2018. As UN chief 
António Guterres notes, ‘this is not a natural disaster. It is man-made.’ Available at: 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1024782  
21 In the European context, Carl Jung notes that among philosophers, theologians and psychiatrists, good and evil are widely 
assumed as concrete facts rather than perceptions or principles. See: Carl Gustav Jung, ‘Good and Evil in Analytical Psychology’, 
Journal of Analytical Psychology​ ​5​, no. 2, 91-100. 1960; For more on the representation of terrorism as a battle between good and evil 
in popular culture, see: Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, ‘Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism,’ ​New Political Science ​28, no.3, 
335-351. 2006; For an account of the good/evil binary in political discourse, see: Joseba Zulaika, ‘Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy.’ p.149 (University of Chicago Press: 2009). For the barbarism/civilisation narrative in political discourse on terrorism, 
see: Richard Jackson, p.51. 2005.  
22 Milliken, p229. 1999 
23 Ibid.  
24 Milliken, p.230, 1999. 
25 Didier Bigo, ‘Delivering Liberty and Security? The Reframing of Freedom When Associated with Security’. p.400-401. In 
Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera et al (eds) ‘Europe’s 21​st​ Century Challenge: Delivering Liberty and Security. (Ashgate: 2010) 
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how it informs and shapes sets of practices. For this reason, chapter three will unpack the practices borne                                   
from the discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism (i.e. discursive practices).   
The second reason relates to an ethical-normative concern for emancipation. This emancipatory                       
commitment is to understanding problematic or counter-productive practices with a view to arrange a                           
range of alternative practices which alleviate, rather than promote, human suffering. As Stump and Dixit                             
26
argue, the ‘central aim of discourse analysis lies in revealing the means by which language is deployed to                                   
maintain power; what makes critical discourse ‘critical’ is its normative commitment to positive change’.                           
27
More generally, this commitment is held by theoretical traditions which seek to re-imagine discourses and                             
practices that reproduce political realities to the disempowerment of certain constituencies. Using the                         
28
concept of neoliberal governance, this thesis aims to show that Britain’s involvement reflects a wider                             
system of governance which disempowers seemingly disparate civil societies. It will be shown that                           
neoliberal governance forms the context under which the security and prosperity of Yemeni and British                             
civil society are traded off to satisfy elite, rather than national, interests.  
 
The thesis is structured in four parts. In this introductory chapter, the following subsections will provide a                                 
review of the relevant literature.  
Using the internal documentary record, Chapter Two will provide a historical context in which                           
two central objectives of British governance in Yemen will be highlighted. Namely, the economic                           
objective to access markets for the benefit of British commercial enterprise, and the political objective to                               
maintain a political and economic climate favourable to achieving this principal goal. Historically guided                           
by these commercial and geostrategic interests, Britain’s historical objectives cast important light on its                           
recent involvement. It will be argued that current discourse and practice have emerged from a historical                               
context in which practical concern about humanitarianism or reducing political violence were not held by                             
the government and corporate entities responsible for the governance of Yemen.  
Against this historical background, Chapter Three forms the core of the investigation. Using                         
statements from senior officials, this chapter will provide a critical discourse analysis of two central                             
themes through which the government represents and reproduces its involvement in Yemen.                       
Conceptualised as the discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism, it is shown how these two                           
bodies of statements communicate alleged objectives and legitimate the performance of certain practices.                         
Within the discourse of humanitarianism, it is first argued that officials represent Britain as a benevolent                               
and civilising force in Yemen. Next, it will be argued that the representation of Britain as a humanitarian                                   
26 For more on commitment to emancipation in terrorism studies, see: Matt Macdonald, ‘Emancipation and Critical Terrorism 
Studies’, ​European Political Science​, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp 252-259, 2007; Sondre Lindahl, ‘A CTS model of counterterrorism’, ​Critical 
Studies on Terrorism​, Vol 10, Issue 3, 2017. 
27 Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit, ‘Critical Terrorism Studies: An Introduction to Research Methods.’ (Routledge: 2013), p.109.  
28 Mitchell Dean ‘Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society’, (Sage Publications: 2010); Didier Bigo, ‘Security and 
Immigration: Toward a critique of governmentality of unease.’ ​Alternatives ​27, no.1, 63-92. 2002; Marina Espinoza ‘State 
terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme’ ​Critical Studies on Terrorism​, 1-18. 2018.  
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actor in Yemen hinges on an appeal to the concept of ‘British values’. This second discursive feature                                 
presents Britain’s objectives as humanitarian by virtue of an inherent set of national, liberal values. In so                                 
doing, it is shown that officials make an appeal to a national and historical mythology that enlarges                                 
Britain’s role as a humanitarian force. The final discursive feature relates to discourse productivity. It is                               
argued that the claims and narratives help to legitimate the performance of a blockade, which sharply                               
contrasts with the discourse of humanitarianism.  
The next section turns to the body of statements that represent the government’s involvement in                             
terms of countering terrorism. The ‘discourse of counterterrorism’ holds that Britain faces an existential                           
threat from Yemeni terrorism. In doing so, it is argued that officials draw upon the ‘good and evil’                                   
narrative. It is then argued that this affects discursive practice, as aerial bombing is normalised as a                                 
necessary response to threat of terrorism according to the national interest.  
Chapter Four will more closely evaluate this appeal to the national interest. Here, it is shown that                                 
this appeal is unsupported. It is argued that Britain’s involvement in Yemen is part of a wider mode of                                     
governance under which an elite constituency is prioritised. To do so, the ‘national interest’ will be prized                                 
apart into its two central arguments: claims about improving national security and increasing prosperity.                           
This will enable an evaluation of whether actual practices satisfy the objectives and justifications for                             
involvement stated under the two central discourses. First, it will highlight inconsistencies in the                           
discourses of humanitarianism and counter-terrorism. This will involve showing that the provision of aid                           
is outstripped by the arms sales, of which two-thirds hit civilian targets. Contrary to their justificatory                               
discourses, these practices will be shown to promote human suffering and further embed violence into                             
the Yemeni context. Next, it will inspect the argument that UK involvement benefits the national                             
economy. It will be shown that arms sales and military cooperation have little observable benefit to the                                 
UK’s national economy and prosperity: the pillars on which the UK-Saudi relationship is based. More                             
broadly, it is suggested that truly reducing human suffering and political violence is contingent on a shift                                 
away from neoliberal security governance, in which the arms trade underpinning violence in Yemen is a                               
clear case study. Under this mode of governance, UK arms sales are symptomatic of an explicit social                                 
policy which prioritises elite economic interests at the expense of the wider populations, both in the UK                                 
and abroad.  
 
11 
 
Literature review 
In the field of international relations (IR), scholarship on Anglo-Yemeni relations is limited. In                           
29
particular, three key issues are rarely addressed in the existing literature: ​(1) the political-economic                           
relationship between the UK and Yemen, in which sustaining energy and defence relations with Saudi                             
Arabia is central; ​(2) the discourse and language used by officials to represent this relationship; and ​(3)                                 
the primary beneficiaries of this relationship (i.e. the extent to which the relationship serves a wider                               
national interest). To address these issues, it is first useful to review the existing literature. 
 
The political economy of Anglo-Yemeni relations: a historical perspective 
The UK government’s involvement in Yemen centres on its alliance with Saudi Arabia. According to                             
policymakers and scholars alike, this relationship and the military operation it sustains serves the national                             
interest. Specifically, it satisfies the national interest’s two central features: national security and national                           
prosperity. Similarly, the government defends its relationship with Saudi Arabia on the grounds that it                             
serves the national interests via these two features. Central to an understanding of Anglo-Yemeni                           
30
relations, then, are these political-economic pillars on which UK-Saudi relations also rest.  
However, there is a shortage of research that examines the political and economic features of                             
UK’s relationship with Yemen, particularly in the historical context of UK-Saudi relations. In large part,                             
the existing scholarship fails to consider the historical and political conditions under which structural                           
violence and instability in Yemen has emerged. There are few studies on the impact of UK-Saudi relations                                 
on violence and instability in Yemen, or indeed elsewhere. Despite this relationship’s role in the creation                               
of political violence, scholars of IR, security and terrorism have paid it relatively little attention. In general,                                 
many of which emerge from the ‘critical’ margins of terrorism and security studies, as well as the fields of                                     
history, anthropology, and sociology.​ .  
31
In these arenas, scholars turn their concern to the impact of the empire in shaping a                               
socio-political and discursive context in which political violence is embedded. For example, in his                           
indispensable texts on foreign policy, historian Mark Curtis uses the de-classified archival record to                           
29 A survey of the leading IR journals shows little attention has been given to Yemen or broader Anglo-American-Yemeni 
relations. In ‘International Studies Quarterly’ (2010-17), Yemen was not the central focus or case-study in a single article. It is 
mentioned in passing in thirty-one articles. Available online at: 
https://academic.oup.com/isq/search-results?page=1&q=yemen&allJournals=1&f_ContentType=Journal+Article&fl_SiteID=
5394&rg_ArticleDate=01%2f01%2f2010+TO+12%2f30%2f2017​. Since 1974, three Sage journal articles within the field of 
Politics & International Relations have cited ‘Yemen’ in the title. In the British Journal of Politics and International Relations 
(2005-2017), five articles cite the term ‘Persian Gulf’, four cite ‘Yemen’. None concern the UK’s involvement in the country. 
Available online at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/action/doSearch?content=articlesChapters&countTerms=true&sortBy=Ppub&target=default&C
onceptID=6413&field1=Title&text1=yemen&field2=AllField&text2=&publication=&Ppub=&Ppub=&AfterYear=&BeforeYe
ar=&earlycite=on&access 
30 Armida van Rij and Benedict Wilkinson, ‘Security cooperation with Saudi Arabia: Is it worth it for the UK?’. The Policy 
Institute at King’s, 2018. 
31 For historians, see: Priya Satia, ‘Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the 
Middle East’. Oxford University Press, 2008; Ian Cobain, ‘The History Thieves: Secrets, Lies, and the Shaping of a Modern 
Nation.’ (Portobello Books: 2016). In the field of anthropology, see: Timothy Mitchell, ‘Carbon Democracy: Political Power in 
the Age of Oil’, (Verso: 2005).  
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highlight Britain’s ‘principal economic objective’. This ‘priority of foreign policy’, as one internal                         
government document puts it, is to ‘contribute within our economic capability to international stability                           
and the protection of our interests in the rest of the world from which so many of our raw materials                                       
derive, [with] particular attention to the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa’. Central to                             
32
this objective is ‘to act in support of our commercial and financial interests throughout the world’. To                                 
support this raison d’être, the UK government and its intelligence agencies have often forcibly ensured                             
political and economic conditions favourable to British commercial enterprise. As Chapter Two will                         
show, this involved systematically promoting violent, anti-democratic forces and suppressing anti-colonial                     
or secular-nationalist movements. Indeed, the creation of the modern Saudi state under the British                           
Empire is a clear example of these objectives at work. As Curtis notes, while Churchill regarded the state’s                                   
founding father ‘intolerant and blood-thirsty’, he also held for him a great ‘admiration because of his                               
unfailing loyalty to us’. Due to this loyalty, Britain supported the formation of a state that rests on a                                     
33
religious-politico alliance through which clerical institutions afford political authority to an unaccountable                       
ruling family protected by the UK security apparatus. While largely unaddressed in the existing literature,                             
this relationship is critical to a deeper understanding of present day Yemen. 
In many ways, the dynamics of international terrorism are intimately linked to the UK-Saudi                           
alliance. As certain former intelligence officers and scholars note, there is little analytical utility in                             
separating contemporary so-called ‘jihadist’ terrorism from the material and institutional support provided                       
by M16, the CIA and Saudi Arabia to the Mujahedeen (via the Pakistani ISI) in Afghanistan, 1979.                                   
34
More recently, there is a broad consensus in the intelligence community that the so-called Islamic State                               
emerged and grew from a context defined by the power vacuums and grievances created by the 2003                                 
invasion of Iraq. Recently de-classified documents show that this view was widespread among policy                           
planners and intelligence officials both prior to and throughout the invasion. As a result of intervention,                               
35
Foreign Office researchers noted that a ‘period of post-Saddam political instability’ would likely cause                           
organisations ‘looking for identities on which to base movements’ would ‘build on ‘anti-Western                         
sentiment’ and use violence for political gain. In Britain, the connection between recruitment into                           
36
32 Mark Curtis, ‘Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses’. (Random House: 2004). Available online at: 
http://markcurtis.info/2016/04/08/britains-principal-global-economic-goals/  
33 Winston Churchill, cited in Mark Curtis, ‘Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam’, p.35. (Serpent’s Tail: 2010).  
34 From the intelligence community, see former M15 officer: Annie Machon, ‘Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: M15 and the David 
Shayler Affair’. Book Guild Ltd. 2005. For historians, see: Mark Curtis, Eqbal Ahmed, ‘Terrorism: Theirs and Ours’, (Seven 
Stories Press: 2001), William Blum, ‘Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower’, (Zed Books: 2006).  
35 The Guardian, ‘Intelligence files support claims Iraq invasion helped spawn Isis’, 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/intelligence-files-support-claims-iraq-invasion-helped-spawn-isis  
36 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, ‘Islamism in Iraq’, 2002. Cited in The Independent, ‘Tony Blair was made fully 
aware of post-Saddam chaos risk in Iraq bur went to war anyway. 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chilcot-report-tony-blair-made-fully-aware-of-post-saddam-chaos-risk-in-iraq
-but-went-to-war-anyway-a7122421.html​ . 
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terrorist organisations and grievances against British foreign policy is similarly well-established in                       
government and within the intelligence community.   
37
However, the mainstream fields of terrorism and security studies maintain a distance from these                           
findings. In particular, scholarship on political violence subjugates accounts of the UK government’s                         
systematic use of, and support for, violence in order to achieve certain economic and geostrategic                             
objectives. Further, it rarely accounts for the fact that organised political violence often emerges in                             
response to or as resistance to the pursuit of these objectives. The impact of being viewed as a ‘crusader                                     
state’ is consistently overlooked. In a review of under-researched topics on political violence, Alex P.                             
Schmid and James J. Forest encourage further research on ‘how states have helped incubate or enable the                                 
growth of jihadism in major foreign fighter arenas and why that has backfired’. As an example, the                                 
38
authors refer only to the role of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in a CIA-directed covert operation which cost                                   
the US taxpayer $3 billion. While the UK government publicly denied non-diplomatic involvement, it                           
provided covert military training and arms supplies for the mujahedeen. However, the authors follow the                             
tendency in mainstream foreign policy analyses to overlook the use of indiscriminate violence by liberal                             
democratic states, as well as their role in the politico-historical context from which terrorism has emerged.                             
As Ruth Blakeley notes, global Northern state violence imposed through counterterrorism programmes                         
39
which violate international law are rarely explored. Instead, as the final chapter will argue, the UK-Saudi                               
military operation exercises violence and serves as a precondition for organised political violence, but is                             
framed as beneficial to national security and prosperity.  
Indeed, this supports Andrew Silke’s finding that historical context is ‘almost entirely ignored’ in                           
the field of terrorism and political violence. This speaks to a specific lack of historical context in the                                   
40
terrorism and security studies literature on the UK’s relations with Yemen and the wider Middle East. In                                 
41
Yemen, political violence, civil war and social mobilisations have not emerged from a political and                             
historical vacuum. As such, the failure to contextualise such issues limits our understanding of them. Yet,                               
37 Michael Jay, ‘Letter to Cabinet Secretary: Relations with Muslim Community’, 2004. In 2004, the Foreign Office’s permanent 
under-secretary warned Blair that involvement in Iraq would lead to a view of Britain as a ‘crusader sate’ and serve as a 
recruitment tool for violent groups. Available online at: ​http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10017.htm​; The 
Guardian, ‘Former M15 chief delivers damming verdict on Iraq invasion’. Former M15 Chief, Eliza Manningham-Butler, told the 
Chilcot Inquiry that British involvement ‘substantially’ increased the overall threat to (inter)national security from terrorism, and 
‘radicalised a whole generation of young people’. ​https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/20/chilcot-mi5-boss-iraq-war​; The 
Guardian, ‘Iraq war was recruiting sergeant.’ 2006. A study for the Ministry of Defence found that Iraq was a ‘recruiting sergeant 
for extremists’; UK Joint Intelligence Committee Memo February 2003, cited in New Statesman, ‘Did the invasion of Iraq 
heighten the threat from al-Qaeda inspired terrorism?’, 2011. The memo to Blair noted that ‘threat of al Qaeda would be 
heightened by military action against Iraq’.  
38 Alex P. Schmid and James J. Forest, ‘Un- and Under-Researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-)Terrorism Studies, ​Perspectives 
on Terrorism.​ Volume 5, Issue 1. P.76. 2011 
39 Ruth Blakeley, ‘State terrorism in the social sciences: theories, methods and concepts’, p. 12, in Richard Jackson, Eamon 
Murphy and Scott Poynting (eds)., ‘Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice’. p13. (Routledge: 2009) 
40 Andrew Silke, ‘A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism’. p.46, in Hsinchun Chen et al (eds)., 
Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, (Springer: 2008). Silke’s finding is that 
just 3.9 per-cent of articles in leading terrorism journals (1990-2006) analysed pre-9/11 conflicts.  
41 Most historical accounts appear in journals on Middle East Studies. For example, Robert D. Burrowes, ‘Prelude to Unification: 
The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962 – 1990. ​International Journal of Middle East Studies​. Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 483-506, 1991.  
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dominant analyses of the coalition’s operations in Yemen follow this pattern. For example, scholars                           
betray an analytical blindness of the UK’s regional objectives inhibits a clear understanding of the Yemeni                               
context. As historian Miriam M. Müller notes, ‘since the launch of Saudi Arabia’s “Decisive Storm”                             
operation against the Houthi movement, [the] Western media and self-declared experts appear to be in                             
favour of more accessible but regularly oversimplified explanations for the current escalation of violence                           
in Yemen. The popular focus on the Sunni-Shiite nature of the struggle, swiftly reinterpreted as a “proxy                                 
war” between Riyadh and Tehran, is only one example among many.’   
42
In the existing literature, scholars draw upon the Sunni-Shiite binary and analytically isolate                         
Al-Qaeda/Houthi violence from the Saudi-led intervention supported by governments in the UK and the                           
United States. As such, recent scholarship overstates Iran’s role and the extent of Houthi violence by                               
43
obscuring the relative level of UK/US support for the coalition and its greater culpability for civilian                               
causalities. Furthermore, the relationship between structural violence and British colonial rule in Yemen                         
remains a form of subjugated knowledge. As such, this thesis will provide a deeper understanding of the                                 
Yemeni context by avoiding the tendency to overlook the key actors involved in shaping historical and                               
political context from which violence emerges. To do so, it will situate the campaign in historical                               
perspective (Chapter Two) and will not to take the view of Yemen’s ‘forgotten war’ as independent from                                 
structural determinants in which the UK-Saudi alliance is central.  
 
Foreign policy as (in) discourse 
Language is a key determinant of our perceptions, structures cognition, and is a medium of legitimation.                               
44
In large part, human beings process and understand the world through stories or narratives. In global                               
Northern liberal democracies, the dominant national story holds that the state upholds human rights and                             
liberty at home and abroad. In these national settings, scholars and policymakers alike draw upon a range                                 
of narratives, shared histories, and legal justifications to support and legitimate policy practices. For                           
instance, both spheres narrativise covert targeted killing via drone campaigns and full-scale military                         
interventions as necessary and legal instruments to reduce levels of violence. Similarly, policy-makers                         
45
and opinion-shapers appeal to notions of humanitarian militarism, and to the allegedly rigorous licensing                           
42 Miriam M. Müller, ‘A Spectre is Haunting Arabia: How the Germans Brought Their Communism to Yemen’. p.14. (Colombia 
University Press: 2016).  
43 Notable examples include: R. Kim Cragin, ‘Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S Counterterrorism Strategy’. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 38 (5): 311- 327; Authors note the ‘Yemeni cultural values that conduce towards violence’ ​in ​Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce 
Loidolt, Madeleine Wells, ‘Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon’. RAND Corporation. 2010. 
P.112. Jill Ricotta, ‘The Arab Shi’a Nexus: Understanding Iran’s Influence in the Arab World’. ​The Washington Consensus, ​vol. 39, 
Issue 2. 2016; Emile Hokayem & David B. Roberts, ‘The War in Yemen’. ​Survival​: Global Politics and Strategy. 58 (6): 157-186. 
2016; Barak Barfi, ‘Yemen On The Brink?: The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen’. ​Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper. 
New America Foundation. 2010.  
44 Richard Jackson, ‘Language, Power and Politics: Critical Discourse Analysis and the War on Terrorism.’, p.3, ​49​th ​Parallel. ​2014. 
Available online at: ​https://fortyninthparalleljournal.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/1-jackson-language-power-and-politics.pdf​. 
Elsewhere, in linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt’s view, language is a system which makes infinite use of finite means. Under such a 
view, more recently proposed by Noam Chomsky, it is possible to create an infinite number of correct sentences using a set 
number of grammatical rules.  
45 Jameel Jaffar, ‘The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy, and the Law. (The New Press: 2016).  
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of arms exports. In ‘A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq’, for example, Tony                                 
46
Blair’s argument for interventionism sits alongside several government officials and public intellectuals.                       
47
The discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism in which these justifications are made are of                           
central analytical concern for this study on UK involvement in Yemen.  
In a landmark study, Joseba Zulaika examines the ‘follies and fables’ underlying the ways in which                               
terrorism is constructed in the public imagination. Building on this, Richard Jackson uses the concepts                             
48
of narrative and discourse to advance an understanding of the process behind ‘writing the war on                               
terrorism’. Similarly, in critical security studies, Jack Holland argues that ‘selling the war’ relied upon                             
49
distinct foreign policy discourses. On the US’s role in the ‘war on terror’, Chomsky argues that while ‘it                                   
50
may be masked in pious rhetoric, [it] is a dominant force in world affairs and must analysed in terms of its                                         
causes and motives’. With historical perspective, this thesis’s focus on officials’ discourses aims to cast                               
51
light on these causes and motives with respect to Britain in Yemen. To build on these analyses, it is useful                                       
to further consider what is meant by discourse, and why an analysis of public language is critical to                                   
furthering our deeper understanding of Anglo-Yemeni relations.  
Foreign policy strategies, such as the pattern of military interventions during the so-called ‘war on                             
terror’, are discursive performances in which a set of practices are legitimated through accompanying                           
discourses. Accordingly, the consistent articulation of legitimising narratives and discourses are necessary                       
for the government to conduct foreign policy. For example, investigations into the 2003 invasion of Iraq                               
have confirmed allegations that officials both overstated the veracity of their justificatory arguments and                           
understated broader strategic objectives. As Piers Robinson highlights, the Chilcot Inquiry highlights a                         
52
broader and covert post-9/11 geo-strategic policy supported by a ‘close knit propaganda campaign’. In                           
53
their public language, officials used a narrative of a battle between ‘good and evil’ (which chapter three                                 
shows is still employed); fabricated a link between Saddam’s Iraq to Al Qaeda; and untruthfully presented                               
evidence for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). On this basis, scholars of sociology and media                             
studies have furthered our understanding of officials’ public language as sites for political persuasion and                             
46 Anna Stavrianakis, ‘The Façade of Arms Control: How the UK’s export licensing system facilitates the arms trade’. ​Campaign 
Against The Arms Trade​. 2008.  
47 Thomas Cusherman (ed), ‘A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq’. (University of California Press: 
2005).  
48 Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass, ‘Terror and Taboo: The follies, fables and faces of terrorism. (Routledge: 1996).  
49 Richard Jackson, ‘Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism’. (University of Manchester Press: 
2005).  
50 Jack Holland, ‘Selling the war on terror: foreign policy discourses after 9/11’. (Routledge: 2012).  
51 Noam Chomsky, ‘Who Rules the World’, p.67, (Metropolitan Books: 2017).  
52 Piers Robinson and Eric Herring, 'Report X Marks the Spot: the British Government’s Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and 
WMD'. ​Political Science Quarterly ​, 2014/15, 129 (4): 551-584, 2014.  
53 Piers Robinson, ‘Learning from the Chilcot Report: Propaganda, Deception and the ‘War on Terror’. ​International Journal of 
Contemporary Iraqi Studies ​11 (1), 2017. Using internal government documents, it was shown that part of this covert geo-strategic 
policy was to invade countries in the broader Middle East, including Syria and Yemen.  
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opinion-shaping. By viewing public language as such, this thesis speaks to the demand for further                             
54
scholarly inquiry into the role of deception and propaganda in liberal democracies. 
The importance of managing the consent of the domestic population is well understood within                           
government. In internal records, the specific ​language afforded to government activities is acknowledged                         
as crucial for securing consent. For example, a document produced by the UK Ministry of Defence’s                               
(MOD) think-tank notes ‘the need to maintain public and political support and hence freedom of action                               
and manoeuvre’. The MoD ‘Media Doctrine’ states: ‘all Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) Departments                         
must act in a coordinated fashion to achieve the Government’s strategic aim. Critical to this is the                                 
maintenance of political and popular support for HMG’s strategic objectives and any military activity in                             
support of it. The media is a key body (the ‘Means’) by which opinion is shaped with theatre, national and                                       
international audiences and is therefore a consideration during the prosecution of military operations.’                         
55
This resonates with an important principle within the politico-military establishment. Namely, to secure                         
public support for operations despite violations of international law and overwhelming public opposition.                       
Further indication of this principle at work is the government’s momentary stance of denialism. In                               
56
2016, a leading MoD official misled Parliament by stating that the ‘UK was not a party to the conflict’.   
57
However, discourse-oriented research on liberal governments’ security and counterterrorism                 
operations reside on the field’s ‘critical’ margins. As Jennifer Milliken argues, leading IR scholars have                             
raised several criticisms of so-called discourse scholarship. While Stephen Walt highlights its                       
‘self-indulgence’, Keohane and Mearsheimer rue the ‘bad science’ inherent in its lack of testable theories                             
and empirical analyses. Similarly, several terrorism scholars use these arguments to reject critical                         
58
approaches to security and terrorism studies , which are distinctive in their critique of state-centred                           
59
54 David Miller, ‘Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq’. (Pluto Press: 2003); Piers Robinson, Vian 
Bakir, Eric Herring and David Miller, 'Organised Persuasive Communication: A New Conceptual Framework for Research on 
Promotional Culture, Public Relations and Propaganda’. ​Critical Sociology​. 2018. 
55 Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Media Operations: Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1. 2007. 
Available online at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43336/jdp3451.pdf  
56 Save the Children, ‘Most Britons Oppose UK Arms Role in Yemen – Poll’, 2017. On Yemen, a YouGov poll found that 1 in 
10 people in the UK support government policy and think sales should remain unchanged. Fifty one per-cent of Britons oppose 
approving arms sales to countries militarily involved in Yemen. Available online at: 
https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/most-britons-oppose-uk-arms-role-yemen-poll  
57 Tobias Ellwood, Yemen: Military Aircraft: Written question – 47677’. 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2016-10-
10/47677/ “The United Kingdom is not a member of the Saudi-led coalition and UK personnel are not involved in directing or 
conducting operations in Yemen, or in the target selection process; For a fuller account of misleading statements on Britain’s 
involvement, see: Mark Curtis, ‘Are British ministers consistently misleading parliament on their Middle East policy’, ​Middle East 
Eye​, 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/are-british-ministers-consistently-misleading-parliament-their-middle-east-policy-13818
98945 
58 Keohane, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994/5 ​in ​Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research Methods’. ​European Journal of International Relations​. 1999.  
59 John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, ‘A case against “critical terrorism studies,” ​Critical Studies on Terrorism​, pp.51-64, No.1, 2008; 
David Martin Jones and Mike LR Smith, ‘We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical – or Hypocritical – Studies “on” Terrorism?’, ​Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism​, 32, no. 4, pp.292-302, 2009.  
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discourses and the ways in which they accompany (and legitimate) illegal, counter-productive practices .                         
60
Broadly, ‘critical’ scholars maintain that state-centred discourses are worthy of analysis for their role in                             
(re)producing security practices of ethical-normative, legal and socioeconomic concern. In contrast,                     
61
‘traditional’ security or terrorism scholars reject the view that the public language used by officials holds                               
motives other than those which are stated. Under such a view, worthwhile discourse-oriented research                           
does not problematise the doctrine which accompanies violent practices performed by liberal                       
democracies.   
These criticisms cannot be divorced from the institutions and concentrations of power from                         
which they emerge. Studies on the politics of knowledge production acknowledge the ‘impossibility of                           
neutral or objective terrorism knowledge’ and the ‘political uses to which it can be put, as well as its                                     
inbuilt biases and assumptions’. While these important dynamics are beyond the scope of this thesis,                             
62
they speak to an important epistemological commitment to challenging dominant discourses which                       
legitimate foreign policy practices shown to violate international law and prove counter-productive to                         
human welfare. As Edward Said argues, in thought and practice, much of Anglo-American foreign policy                             
resides on orientalist assumptions which help to shape the public’s views. Alluding to the discourse of                               
63
humanitarianism explored in chapter three, Said notes that ‘every single empire in its official discourse has                               
said that it is not like the others…that it has a mission to enlighten, civilise, bring order and democracy,                                     
and that it uses force only as a last resort’. In the context of UK-Middle East relations, the formation of                                       
64
‘policy-relevant’ research is often shaped by powerful commercial interests expressed through the news                         
media and think-tank funding. ​Widely understated in scholarship, influential think-tanks and                     
65
sophisticated public relations campaigns ​further reinforce dominant knowledge which legitimates foreign                     
60 For examples from the discourse and practice of the UK’s domestic counterterrorism programme (and its legal, 
ethical-normative and socioeconomic issues), see: Charlotte Heath-Kelly, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing 
the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy’. ​British Journal of Politics and International Relations​, Vol 15, 
p.394-415, 2013; Francesco Ragazzi, ‘Suspect community or suspect category? The impact of counter-terrorism as ‘policed 
multiculturalism’, ​Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies​, 42:5, 724-741, 2016.  
61 For critical terrorism/security studies, see: Richard Jackson, ‘The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies’, ​European 
Political Science, ​6 (3). Pp. 244-251. 2007; Ken Booth, ‘Critical Security Studies and World Politics’. (Lynne Rienner:2005) 
62 Jackson, 2007. p.247 
63 Edward Said, ‘Covering Islam: How the media and experts determine the way we see the rest of the world’. (Random House: 
2008).   
64 Said, p. xvi. 1979.  
65 Consider the funding of the most influential (in terms of closeness to government) think-tanks in London and Washington, all 
of which have large donations from major defence companies, private security contractors, hedge-funds with sizeable stakes in 
military-based companies. See: David Miller and Tom Mills, ‘The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and 
its dominance in the news media’, ​Critical Studies on Terrorism​, Vol. 2, pp.414-437, 2009.  
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policy practices. Further, the political influence of corporate enterprise has increased through lobbying                         
66
and the revolving door between government and corporate infrastructure.  
67
In large part, these tendencies explain the shortage of analyses on the discourse and practice of                               
foreign policy. In this sense, the discursive representation of military activities helps to legitimate and                             
justify practices which are profitable for corporations often linked to policy-making and opinion-shaping                         
in the field of terrorism and security. As such, a key aim of this thesis is to advance an understanding of                                         
the discursive context in which violence is made possible and performed.  
 
Neoliberal governance: private versus national interest 
In mainstream scholarship and news media, the conventional wisdom maintains a compatibility between                         
the UK government’s licensing of arms exports to Saudi Arabia and its stated objectives to increase                               
national security and prosperity. In defence of the arms trade, officials make two arguments that define a                                 
68
wider appeal to the national interest. The first is an ‘appeal to prosperity’, which holds that defence                                 
exports are beneficial to the national economy. Under such a view, arms sales benefit the UK’s industrial                                 
employment base and promote economic growth. The second is an ‘appeal to security’, which holds that                               
arms sales are beneficial to (inter)national security. Collectively, these arguments are employed to define                           
69
the national interest. As David Cameron puts it, ‘​our national interest is easily defined. It is to ensure our                                   
future prosperity and to keep our country safe in the years ahead.’  
70
Cameron’s definition relates to the view that political power protects the ‘common good’ – a core                               
idea in the liberal philosophical tradition which underpins contemporary liberal governance. Defined as                         
71
such, the national interest is central to the government’s representation of domestic and international                           
affairs. Crucially, it serves to explain the range of practices in these arenas. As such, the concept is key to                                       
66 For further detail on arms industry lobbying in the UK, see: Campaign Against the Arms Trade, ‘Resources: Influence’, 2015. 
Available online at: ​https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/influence  
In the US, Saudi lobbyists contacted every senator and spent up to $9m in lobbying costs (2017). For more, see: Project on 
Government Oversight, ‘How Much Saudi Spends on Influencing Public Opinion’, 2018; ​The Nation​, ‘How Much It Costs to Buy 
US Foreign Policy’, Ben Freeman. 2018. Freeman finds that ‘registered foreign agents working on behalf of interests in Saudi 
Arabia contacted congressional representatives, the White House, the media, and figures at influential think tanks more than 
2,500 times in 2017 alone. ​https://www.thenation.com/article/how-much-it-costs-to-buy-us-foreign-policy/ 
67 Campaign Against Arms Trade, ‘Political Influence: Revolving Door’, 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.caat.org.uk/issues/influence/revolving-door  
68 BBC News, ‘Mixed success for Saudi military operation in Yemen’, 2015. While not an opinion piece, this news report was 
authored by Michael Stephens – research fellow for the state-centred Royal United Services Institute. For more, see: David 
Wearing, ‘Why is the BBC presenting RUSI as objective analysts of the Middle East?’, ​Open Democracy​, 2015. As noted earlier, 
UK-Saudi relations (of which the arms trade is a central feature) is largely ignored in recent scholarship.  
69 Human Rights and Democracy Report 2015, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-
2015  
70 David Cameron, ‘A transcript of Prime Minister David Cameron's foreign policy speech to the Lord Mayor's Banquet in 
London’, 2010. Available online at: ​https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-to-lord-mayors-banquet 
71 Waheed Hussain, ‘The Common Good’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2018. For instance, Hussain points to John 
Locke’s argument that political power ought to be used only to advance the ‘peace, safety, and public good of the People’ (i.e. all 
members of a political community). In the U.S context, the importance of the ‘common good’ to the nation-state is evident in the 
Federalist Papers. See: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, ‘The Federalist Papers: No 57, February 19, 1788’, The Avalon 
Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Available online at: ​http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed57.asp  
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the liberal nation-state, and by extension the field of IR theory. Indeed, a realist conceptualisation is                               
72
evident in the appeal to security for maintaining arms sales. For Morgenthau, the national interest is                               
defined in terms of survival and protection ‘against encroachments by other nation-states’.   
73
This thesis problematises the government’s usage of the term. It seeks to build upon research                             
which finds governmental practice to be inconsistent with the doctrinal appeal to national interest.                           
Specifically, it will be shown that, as Chomsky argues, ‘​within a particular nation-state, some groups are                               
sufficiently powerful to exert a major, perhaps dominant interest of state policy and the ideological                             
system. Their special interests then become, in effect, ‘the national interest’. In this sense, ‘the ‘national                               
74
interest’ serves to conceal the ways in which state policy is formed and executed.’  
75
A number of studies provide valuable assessments of the government’s appeal to the national                           
interest. For example, Armida van Rij and Benedict Wilkinson find that there is no sound evidence to                                 
support the appeals to prosperity and security with respect to existing relations with Saudi Arabia. In                               
76
economic terms, the authors show that trading relations with Saudi Arabia provides little benefit to the                               
UK population. Similarly, the benefits to security are not significant enough to justify the importance                             
placed on the relationship by the government. The study highlights the tension between the government’s                             
position and low public support for engagement with Saudi Arabia. This tension speaks to a suppression                               
of democratic will to scrutinise support for Saudi state, which has been shown to regularly commit human                                 
rights abuses against its own population and is alleged to have committed to crimes under international                               
law in Yemen. This speaks to a wider feature of neoliberal governance, which ‘encases’ democracy in                               
77
policy areas dominated by corporate interests.  
Moreover, the work of Anna Stavrianakis, Andrew Feinstein and Campaign Against Arms Trade                         
is of great significance. To understand Britain’s involvement in Yemen, Anna Stavrianakis’s work on the                             
arms industry and liberal militarism is critical. Crucially, Stavrianakis highlights the human cost of the                             
government’s arms exports policy and the ways in which the government seeks to manage the policy’s                               
contradictions.   
78
Using insider interviews and de-classified documents, Feinstein’s account of the arms industry                       
provides important insights into the alliance between the UK government, BAE Systems, and Saudi                           
72 Charles A. Beard, ‘The idea of the national interest: an analytical study in American foreign policy’, 1934, cited in Scott Burchill, 
‘The National Interest in International Relations Theory’, pp.1-2, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005). In a historiographical study, Beard 
shows that central to the rise of the nation-state was the idea of the ‘national interest’. 
73 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Another “Great Debate”: The National Interest of the United States’, ​The American Political Science Review, 
Vol 46, No. 4, p.972, 1952.  
74 Noam Chomsky, ‘Language and Politics’, pp.277-278, (AK Press: 2004). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Armida van Rij and Benedict Wilkinson, ‘Security cooperation with Saudi Arabia: Is it worth it for the UK?’. The Policy 
Institute at King’s, 2018.  
77 Quinn Slobodian, ‘Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism’, p.5, (Harvard University Press: 2018).  
78 Anna Stavrianakis, ‘When Anxious Scrutiny of Arms exports Facilitates Humanitarian Disaster’, ​The Political Quarterly ​89, no.1, 
2018; Anna Stavrianakis, ‘Playing with Words While Yemen Burns: Managing Criticism of UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia’, 
Global Policy ​8, no.4, pp. 563-568, 2017; Anna Stavrianakis, ‘Legitimising liberal militarism: politics, law and war in the Arms Trade 
Treaty,’ ​Third World Quarterly ​37, no.5, pp. 840-864, 2016. 
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Arabia. Feinstein’s key finding speaks to the argument made in chapter four: ‘the arms trade – an intricate                                 
web of networks between the formal and shadow worlds, between government, commerce and                         
criminality – often makes us poorer, not richer, less not more safe, and governed not in our own interests                                   
but for the benefit of a small, self-serving elite, seemingly above the law, protected by the secrecy of                                   
national security and accountable to no one.’​    
79
Feinstein and Stavrianakis highlight the systematic means through which liberal democratic                     
governments contradict official objectives by generating insecurity for global civil society, while protecting                         
the prosperity and political influence of industries most invested in perpetual war. To build on these                               
studies, it will be argued that Britain’s involvement is more deeply understood as part of a wider mode of                                     
neoliberal governance. To this end, Britain’s governance of Yemen will be shown to share the key                               
features of neoliberal governance. Namely, promoting political influence for corporate enterprise and a                         
concentrating of wealth and power within these elite groups. As such, the concept of neoliberal                             
governance is useful to highlight how corporations, rather the wider population, the ‘national interest’.  
For Naomi Klein, the neoliberal order relates to a governmental shift towards the pursuit of three                               
policy directives (privatisation, cuts to social services, and de-regulation) with a view to re-engineer society                             
in the interests of corporations. Based on these directives, as Chomsky argues, this mode of governance                               
80
promotes a transferal of wealth and decision-making away from the public towards the corporate sector.                           
81
As a growing number of scholars show, this erodes democracy and generates structural issues in each                               
governable aspect of social life. Building on Klein’s formulation of neoliberal governance as ‘disaster                           
capitalism’, Antony Loewenstein connects seemingly disparate national settings in which transnational                     
corporations and governments in the UK and US have promoted the upward transferal of wealth in                               
security governance. In education, Henry Giroux and others highlight the ill-effects of privatisation and                           
82
austerity cuts under neoliberal governance. Elsewhere, the discourses and practices of ecological and                         
83
health governance has been shown to shore up the interests of established energy and pharmaceutical                             
companies at the expense of the environment, as well as public welfare and prosperity.  
84
As Colin Leys argues, neoliberal governance entails a corporate take-over of policy that                         
fundamentally runs contrary to the public interest. In the United States, economists Martin Gilens and                             
85
79 Andrew Feinstein, ‘The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade’. p.43 (Macmillan: 2011) 
80 Naomi Klein, ‘The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism’, (Random House: 2007).  
81 Noam Chomsky, ‘How the World Works’, pp.78, (Soft Skull Press: 1992). 
82 Anthony Loewenstein, ‘Disaster Capitalism’, (Verso: 2015).  
83 Henry Giroux, ‘Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a democratic public 
sphere.’ ​Harvard Educational Review​ 72, no. 4, 2002; Marta Baltodano, ‘Neoliberalism and the demise of public education: the 
corporatisation of schools of education, ​International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education​, Vol. 25, Issue 4, 2012; Raewyn 
Connell, ‘The neoliberal cascade and education: an essay on the market agenda and its consequences’, ​Critical Studies in Education​, 
Vol. 54, Issue 2, 2013. 
84 David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu, ‘The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills’, (Basic Books: 2013). Ronald Labonté and David 
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Community Health, ​pp.312-318, Vol. 70, Issue 3, 2016; David Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,’ ​The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science ​, pp.22-44, Vol. 610, Issue 1, 2007; Steve Coll, ‘Private Empire: Exxon Mobil and 
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Benjamin Page empirically show that ‘economic elites and organised groups representing business                       
interests’ command the most significant influence on public policy. This has not gone unnoticed. In                             
86
recent years, civil society groups in a number of national settings have direct resistance against the ways in                                   
which a tiny minority has built up private wealth at the wider population’s expense. This response to                                 
neoliberal governance constitutes the broader context in which the final chapter’s arguments are situated.                           
It is only in this context which Britain’s involvement in Yemen can be fully understood, as part of a wider                                       
pattern of practices that further engender a transferal of public wealth to the corporate sector.                             
Understood in this way, it may be possible to re-narrativise and rearrange the ways in which the                                 
governance of international affairs could truly serve the wider interest rather than a minority group.  
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Chapter Two 
Anglo-Yemeni relations in historical perspective 
 
This chapter will situate contemporary Anglo-Yemeni relations in historical context. It will focus on four                             
historical moments: ​(1) colonising Aden (1839-1933); ​(2) the post-war period to the end of British rule                               
(1945-1967); ​(3) the post-imperial neoliberal order (1979-2000); and (​4) ‘new terrorism’ to revolution                         
(2001-11). It will address two central questions. First, what are the objectives on which Britain has forged                                 
relations with Yemen? Second, how do these objectives further our understanding of Britain’s recent                           
involvement?  
To address the former, this chapter draws upon declassified government documents. This                       
evidence highlights two interrelated governmental objectives. The first relates to geo-strategy and                       
commercialism. Namely, the ​economic ​objective to access markets for the benefit of British commercial                           
enterprise. As Mark Curtis puts it, this is Britain’s ‘principal global economic goal’. To support this, the                                 
87
second objective is to maintain a political and economic climate favourable to achieving the principal goal.                               
This is the ​political ​objective ​to promote or suppress political actors depending on the degree to which                                 
they help to support the principal objective. It will be shown how the pursuit of this objective has                                   
consistently involved dividing tribes and territories, suppressing democratic forces, and promoting                     
political violence to respond to secular-nationalist movements which threaten the interests of British                         
commercial enterprise. It will be argued that the pursuit of these twin policy objectives show that Britain                                 
88
have aimed to keep Yemen an open society; in that it remains ‘open to economic penetration and political                                   
control.’ As Simon McDonald, Head of the Diplomatic Service and Permanent Under-Secretary at the                           
89
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, observes, ‘one way of looking at our history is that the UK has been                                   
active in the world to make the world a safe place for Britain to do business’.   
90
Turning to the second question, it is argued that the historical record provides a deeper                             
understanding of contemporary Anglo-Yemeni relations under neoliberal governance. Characterised by an                     
increased political influence for corporate enterprise, this system of governance helps to maintain and                           
intensify the pursuit of longstanding objectives. Further, present discourses and practices have emerged                         
from a context in which governmental concerns about humanitarianism or reducing political violence                         
were nonexistent. To support this argument, Britain’s two policy objectives will be shown to contrast with                               
87 Mark Curtis, 2004. Passage available online at: ​http://markcurtis.info/2016/04/08/britains-principal-global-economic-goals/ 
88 ​Douglas Little, ‘Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” ​Diplomatic History, ​28, no. 5 
679. 2004.  
89 Noam Chomsky, ‘Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance’, p. 15, (Metropolitan Books: 2003).   
90 BBC Two, ‘Inside the Foreign Office: Keeping Power and Influence.’ Series One, Episode One, 2018. Available online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbXhAE8z3hM​ [45:03-45:15].  
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the key assumptions underlying these discourses. Namely, that advancing human welfare is of primary                           
concern, and that Britain’s sustains its defence exports to Saudi Arabia as a response to terrorism.  
 
Rule Britannia: colonising Aden (1839-1933) 
Yemen’s strategic and commercial importance to Britain’s political and economic elites has historical                         
precedent. In 1839, with a view to establish a permanent coaling station, the Indian Navy forcibly                               
occupied Aden and made it an overseas territory. ​Aden became Queen Victoria’s first imperial acquisition                             
and remained under British rule until 1967. Besides the commercial and strategic importance of the                             
91
region’s resources, the Arabian Peninsula’s value to the British Empire lay in its land and sea routes                                 
between Britain and India. That Aden could be used by imperial France as a stepping stone to India                                   
92
made it all the more important to control this entrance to the Red Sea. To secure her strategic                                   
93
advantage, the British Empire took control of the Bab al-Mandeb: the strait which links the Indian Ocean                                 
and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Central to the transportation of Middle                                   
East oil to Europe and North America, as well as consumer goods between Europe and Asia, the                                 
chokepoint has long been Yemen’s strategic prize. In 2016, approximately eleven per-cent of global                           
94
seaborne petroleum, or 4.8 million barrels a day, passed through the so-called Gulf of Aden.  
95
From a commercial standpoint, both Yemen and neighbouring Saudi Arabia held value to the                           
British Empire as markets for its energy and defence companies to penetrate. To this end, the 1915 Treaty                                   
of Darin attempted to draw borders for a British-protected Saudi state and provide international                           
recognition for the House of Saud. Once the state was established, the House of Saud fought against                                 
96
Yemen’s ruler Imam Yahya in the 1934 Saudi-Yemen War. With British financial support and military                             
97
equipment, Saudi forces marched on disputed areas of the Yemeni border and occupied the port town of                                 
Hodeida. As for the role of the energy industry, in 1915 the British government signed a preferential                                 
98
agreement with the House of Saud to explore the Nejd region. As Fisher et al argue, following the                                   
99
discovery of petroleum, the commercial and political demands of the petroleum industry shaped British                           
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foreign policy. Indeed, ‘the ability of the Foreign Office to exercise influence, and provide protection, for                               
British oil companies operating in the region was highly significant’. In this sense, Anglo-Yemeni                           
100
relations were forged on the principal economic objective which entailed the expansion of military and                             
energy ties with Saudi Arabia. From this point onwards, the Anglo-Yemeni encounter was characterised                           
by British defence and energy companies exercising political influence in concert with the House of Saud.  
 
To support the principal economic objective, Britain supported the House of Saud and suppressed actors                             
that threatened its commercial and strategic ambitions – irrespective of the effect on the wellbeing of the                                 
Yemeni population. A key feature of Britain’s governance of Yemen, which extends into the post-imperial                             
neoliberal order, is a disregard for human welfare in the pursuit of key objectives. In other words, colonial                                   
officials pursued the political aim to create an environment suitable for the penetration of British                             
commercial enterprise at the expense of the wider population.  
In practice, this involved employing a colonial policy of divide and rule. In 1873, Britain created a                                 
list of nine tribes through which it was possible to govern the Aden Protectorate as an overseas territory.                                 
Internal planning documents show that officials recognised the benefit of dividing populations in the                             
101
region. As Viceroy of India Charles Harding states: ‘what we want is not a United Arabia, but a weak and                                       
disunited Arabia, split up into little principalities so far as possible under our suzerainty – but incapable of                                   
coordinated action against us, forming a buffer against the Powers in the West.’ However, in 1928,                               
102
Imam Yahya was ‘the only Arab ruler neither under Western control nor on a Western payroll’ . Despite                                 
103
attempts to win over the Imam, his refusal to recognise British-drawn borders and maintain colonial                             
relations with Britain represented a threat to this order. To reinforce British rule and eliminate Yahya,                               
104
Britain established a Royal Air Force (RAF) command base in Aden. This allowed the RAF to carry out                                   
an aerial bombing campaign on Yahya’s armed forces in Taiz (1928). While Parliament found the                             
campaign to be responsible for ‘killing perfectly innocent natives’, the Secretary of State for the Colonies                               
argued that the bombing was a ‘necessary action’ to achieve a settlement with the Imam. Later, the                                 
105
command base was used to direct warplanes on South Yemen during the rebellion which forced                             
106
Britain’s departure. As such, the British Empire’s practices in this period highlight the political aim to                               
assert strategic dominance and create favourable commercial conditions for its industries - regardless of                           
the welfare of local populations. As Sir Bernard Reilly, the first Governor of Aden (1937-1940), notes: ‘it                                 
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did not apparently occur to the Government of Bombay or the Government of India that they had any                                   
sort of responsibility for the peace or welfare of the Protectorate and its inhabitants’.  
107
On the other hand, maintaining the security and prosperity of Saudi elites was central to Britain’s                               
interests. As intelligence officer T.E Lawrence ‘of Arabia’ notes, Britain hoped to create a ‘ring of client                                 
states, themselves insisting on our patronage’. The support for the House of Saud reveals Britain’s aim                               
108
to ensure Saudi Arabia’s status as a reliable client state. In 1915, Abdul Aziz Al Saud (Ibn Saud hereafter)                                     
began to receive a £5,000 per month subsidy from the British government. In 1922, Churchill increased                               
the subsidy to £100,000 per month in order to consolidate relations. This paid off, as the alliance                                 
109
helped to divide the Aden Protectorate into two administrative regions: The Eastern and Western Aden                             
Protectorate. In this sense, central to the governance of Aden according to British interests was Ibn                               
110
Saud’s aforementioned ‘unfailing loyalty’.   
 
The post-war empire & Aden emergency (1945-1967) 
In 1945, a meeting on the Great Bitter Lake between Ibn Saud and Franklin D. Roosevelt would secure                                   
US access to Saudi petroleum and form the foundation of contemporary Anglo-American-Saudi relations.                       
As a result of this meeting, Ibn Saud agreed to secure access to Saudi oil supplies in return for the                                         
111
protection of his Kingdom through military assistance and training. Britain, similarly, was eager to                           
112
maintain its international prestige through access to Saudi’s natural resources. As an internal planning                           
document notes in 1947: Middle East oil was ‘​a vital prize for any power interested in world influence or                                     
domination.’ In 1956, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd bluntly notes that ‘we must at all costs maintain                               
113
control of this oil’. As such, planners understood that becoming a post-war economic power hinged on                               
114
satisfying the principal economic objective. For instance, in a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Private                             
Secretary Oliver Wright neatly sums up Britain’s principal economic objective in two parts: ‘We have                             
really only two interests in the Middle East. The first is access on reasonable terms to Middle East oil. The                                       
second is overflying rights across the Middle East barrier so that we may get to the other parts of the                                       
world where our presence is necessary’.   
115
Aden’s strategic and commercial importance was cemented by the construction of British                       
Petroleum’s (BP) primary refinery in the region. By the mid 1950s, Aden was the world’s second busiest                                 
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port after New York. As a Cabinet Office memo remarks: ‘strategically (and economically) its                           
116
importance transcends its value as a base…commercially, it is an oil bunkering station, a transit port, and                                 
a centre of a large entrepôt trade. It guards the southern end of the Red Sea…its potential strategic                                   
importance has recently been increased[..]’ As BP historian James Bamberg argues, BP faced a                           
117
‘challenge from nationalism’. This would neither deter the corporation nor the government, because                         
‘Aden was well situated for important crude supplies and for export shipments of products to markets                               
east of Suez and to Europe via the Suez Canal.’ This is summarised in a secret government document,                                   
118
in which officials note that the ‘particular United Kingdom interest at stake…[is] the profits made by the                                 
United Kingdom oil companies from their operations in the [Persian Gulf] area’.   
119
 
Central to increasing profits was the political goal to ensure conditions remained favourable to British                             
companies. This goal, as a 1958 Cabinet Office memo puts it, was to ‘maintain political conditions                               
favourable to our trading requirements throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East.’ In                             
120
Yemen, the government did so using two familiar strategies. First, transferring power to local clients to                               
retain political influence over resources; and second, suppressing secular-nationalist movements. In                     
summary of the first strategy, Governor Reilly notes with unwavering orientalism that ‘British policy in                             
the Aden Protectorate is now one of indirect rule through advice to the tribal chiefs and direct assistance                                   
in matters that the Arabs cannot cope with themselves.’ In this important sense, Youssef M. Choueiri                               
121
argues that ‘it is difficult to draw a neat line separating the colonial period from what followed it’. As                                     
122
such, this pursuit of quasi-colonial governance would protect commercial interests in Britain’s ‘last                         
imperial frontier’. Its central commercial interest, the BP refinery, was built in Aden rather than Kuwait                               
123
or Qatar because it was Britain’s only Middle East colony. Nevertheless, secret memorandum show that                             
124
leading UK and US officials discussed making Kuwait a crown colony in 1958, further highlighting the                               
‘need in developing countries for an economic and political climate attractive to expatriate capital’. In                             
125
this broader context, M16 played a central role in overthrowing democratically elected Mohammad                         
Mosaddegh in Iran for seeking to nationalise and re-distribute the profits accrued by the British                             
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (BP). This demonstrates the convergence of the twin policy objectives at                           
126
play in Yemen: (overt and covert) political intervention to support the penetration of commercial                           
interests.   
127
The suppression of movements that threatened British corporations is clear in the final years of                             
British rule. As Prime Minister Harold Macmillan remarked to President Kennedy in 1962: ‘what we                             
should like to see would be a weak government in Yemen not able to make trouble’. In the Foreign                                     
128
Secretary’s words, ‘our interest is better suited by an authoritarian regime which maintains stability and the                               
Western connection than by untrammelled democracy which rushes downhill toward communism and                       
chaos’. Inconveniently, by the mid-1950s and early sixties, nationalist and anti-colonial movements                       
129
gained momentum due in large part to the influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser. A clear threat to British and                                     
Saudi interests, the government sought to suppress said movements using Saudi Arabia and militant                           
organisations as a counter-weight. The Aden Emergency, or Radfan Uprising (1963-1967), emerged from                         
this anti-imperial social context. To challenge this popular Republican uprising, Saudi Arabia and Britain                           
funded and covertly armed a group of less democratic Royalists. On suppressing the Republicans, Prime                             
Minister Harold Macmillan conceded that it may seem ‘repugnant to political equity and prudence alike                             
that we should so often appear to be supporting out-of-date and despotic regimes and to be opposing the                                   
growth of modern and more democratic forms of government.’ However, Republicanism was deemed                         
130
‘anti-British’ by virtue of its potential to force a ‘devastating blow to our prestige and authority in that                                   
region’. In a covert colonial war, Britain used aerial bombing, torture, and anti-Nasserist propaganda to                             
131
no avail. By 1967, official British rule was no more.  
132
Given the incompatibility between secular-nationalism, the domination of British companies, and                     
regional supremacy for Saudi Arabia - MI6 and the House of Saud planned to overthrow and assassinate                                 
Nasser. In its wider context, this strategy reflects a pattern of Anglo-American operations across the                             
133
Middle East, Latin America and Africa. As noted, intelligence agencies systematically suppressed                       
democratically elected leaders in favour of military dictatorships compliant to UK-US commercial                       
134
enterprise. Crucially, British defence companies such as BAE systems would reap the benefits of this                             
pattern. Clive Jones sums up the further convergence of the twin objectives by arguing that officials                               
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believed covert action was necessary for Britain to maintain its strategic interests and suppress Nasser’s                             
regional appeal.  
135
Moreover, this strategy involved systematically supporting and colluding with organisations                   
which used political violence. As a counter-weight to Nasser’s influence on Yemen and the wider Middle                               
East, the Anlgo-American-Saudi alliance provided support and cover to Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim                           
Brotherhood. Unexpectedly, the alliance’s sub-contractors in the Brotherhood would become integral to                       
international terrorist movements over the next four decades. This period, in which former imperial                           
136
powers began the trend of ‘encouraging the marginalisation of democratic movements and the rise of                             
religious fanaticism’, would be intensified by a strengthening of an alliance between the UK, BAE                             
137
Systems and Saudi Arabia. 
The post-imperial neoliberal order: UK-BAE-Saudi alliance (1979-2000) 
Under Margaret Thatcher’s government, Britain built on its existing relationship with Saudi Arabia                         
according to the key foreign policy objectives. This government ushered in the neoliberal era - a mode of                                   
governance to maintain influence in the post-imperial world order. Its key policy directives -                           
138
privatisation, reduced spending on public services, and de-regulation - would shift the formation of the                             
UK’s pursuit of key political-economic objectives in the Gulf. On a commercial level, this involved an                               
unprecedented level of arms exports, with the arms industry benefitting from extensive state assistance.                           
An expanded and de-regulated financial sector received extensive Saudi petroleum surpluses. To further                         
support British companies, creating favourable business environments involved supporting organised                   
political violence. Politically, this alliance suppressed socio-economic change by supporting                   
139
authoritarian leadership in Yemen; and helped to create a militant organisation which came to dominate a                               
weak Yemeni state.  
Commercially, Britain’s pursuit of the principal economic objective is captured by Margaret                       
Thatcher’s instruction to Defence Secretary Francis Pym to ‘exploit all possible opportunities to extend                           
overseas markets for defence sales’. Britain agreed with Saudi Arabia its largest ever arms deal, and laid                                 
140
the basis for the permanent secondment of approximately seven thousand private employees and military                           
personnel. The Al Yamamah deal (Arabic for ​the ​dove​) secured over £40bn for weaponry, military                             
141
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aircraft, training, and management ; all paid for in 300,000 barrels of oil through British Petroleum.                               
142
Similarly, during the Gulf War, secret memos show that the Thatcher government saw Saddam’s invasion                             
of Kuwait as an ‘unparalleled opportunity’ for defence manufacturers to access energy-rich Gulf                         
monarchies.   
143
As such, the neoliberal re-ordering of the world marked a shift in the practices used by                               
government and corporate enterprise to pursue long-standing objectives in British foreign policy                       
governance. Indeed, the central feature of neoliberal governance is the increased political influence of the                             
corporate sector directed at promoting an upward transferal of wealth and political power. This is visible                               
in the ways that the Thatcher government ‘invigorated’ the arms industry by adopting a ‘permissive                             
approach to arms sales’ . As such, defence corporations seized greater political influence. For example,                           
144
BAE afforded large sums to lobbying political actors. To facilitate the Al Yamamah Deal, BAE made                               
145
payments and bribes in a ‘secret slush fund’ to intermediaries, including up to £1bn to a Saudi prince.                                   
146
Further, government institutions and bureaucratic practices were created to facilitate arms sales and                         
accommodate personnel from the arms industry. The Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD)                       
provided loans to prospective buyers and used public funds as insurance against loan defaults. While this                               
benefitted arms companies, the UK population bore the eventual brunt of defaults on the loans. Since                               
147
1985, the heads of the Defence & Security Organisation (situated within the Department of International                             
Trade), which facilitates arms exports for British companies, has been headed by individuals seconded                           
from senior positions in the arms industry. Between 2010-2016, officials from DSO held over 1,000                             
meetings with individuals from the arms industry. These activities exert a considerable impact on                           
148
decisions to maintain arms sales despite pressure from civil society. As the Campaign Against the Arms                               
149
Trade finds, the government have a ‘politically intimate and hugely compromising’ relationship with the                           
arms industry.   
150
With the help of Saudi Arabia, the government continued to facilitate the growth of British                             
companies in Yemen (via war in Afghanistan). In Afghanistan, the UK supported the US and Saudi                               
Arabia-led operation to create and organise a militant organisation to draw in Soviet forces. This involved                               
142 See Appendix B.  
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144 Mark Phythian, 'Battling for Britain: British arms sales in the Thatcher era’, ​Crime, Law and Social Change. ​Volume 26, Issue 3. 
pp.271-300. 1996. 
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Available online at: ​https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/05/bae-saudi-yamamah-deal-background  
147 James Gerald, ‘In the Public Interest: A Devastating Account of the Thatcher Government's Involvement in the Covert Arms 
Trade By the Man Who Turned Astra Fireworks into a £100M Arms Manufacturer. p.56 (Little, Brown & Company: 1995).  
148 Campaign Against Arms Trade, Political Influence. Available online at: ​https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/influence  
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forcing the US-backed North Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to coordinate a supply of Yemeni                             
militants to Afghanistan. To be sure, the mujahedeen were assured by Thatcher that the ‘hearts of the                                 
151
free world’ were with them. From a security perspective, the creation of the mujahedeen supported the                               
152
architecture of international militancy. After the USSR departed Afghanistan, mujahedeen fighter Osama                       
bin Laden (a Yemeni-born Saudi national) turned his attention to US government’s domination of the                             
global order under which the Saudi state held regional control.  
In Yemen, Britain and Saudi Arabia had a central role in supporting Saleh’s rise to power , which                                 
153
would culminate in the social unrest underlying the Yemeni revolution. Following a pattern of neoliberal                             
governance, this primarily served and deepened a small concentration of wealth and power in the Saleh                               
regime and amongst multinational companies and international finance. IMF-led structural reforms                     
ushered in ‘growth led by private sector activity’ and the ‘legal, judiciary, and regulatory framework                             
necessary to establish a free market environment for private sector activity’. Far from obeying free                               
154
market principles, multinational corporations were supported with subsidies from the British state to                         
export military equipment and prospect for natural resources. Accordingly, Saleh remained in power                         
throughout this period and amassed £2 billion a year via corrupt practices, including payments from                             
multinational energy companies for granting them exclusive contracts.  
155
 
‘New’ terrorism & revolution (2001-11) 
Under the neoliberal order, Yemen’s public infrastructure was subject to a broader pattern of privatisation                             
and a transferal of wealth towards local elites and multinational companies. As Helen Lackner argues, ‘the                               
political crisis, which started with the popular uprisings in 2011, was largely brought about by the                               
economic situation.’ In the years leading up to the revolution, the corruption, inequality and                           
156
unemployment which characterised Saleh’s leadership threatened an economic collapse. By 2004, after                       
failing to implement the IMF’s structural reforms, Yemen’s political-economic viability depended on                       
opposition to Saleh.   
157
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However, under the so-called war on terror, UK (and US) companies and their respective governments                             
maintained their longstanding military and political support for Saleh, who rewarded for his ‘unfailing                           
loyalty’ to these authorities. Under the guise of counterterrorism, liberal democratic states supported a                           
campaign of state violence against dissenting factions in Yemeni civil society (including the Houthis and                             
Southern separatists). Indeed, the regime’s killing of fifty protestors on March 2011 provided the                             
158
pretext for the break-down of Saleh’s US/UK-supported grip on Yemen. These political and economic                           
159
conditions, in large part the product of the longstanding foreign policy objectives described here, shaped                             
the broader context in which public resistance emerged throughout the Middle East and North Africa in                               
2011.  
As for inadvertently promoting political violence, armed resistance was used by political                       
entrepreneurs seeking to exploit the post-Saleh power vacuum. As Alley argues, ‘many instances of                           
violence have been products of opportunistic behaviour as groups compete for popular support,                         
economic resources, and territorial control in the post-Saleh era’. In this important sense, the political                             
160
aim to ensure environments favourable to commercial interests helped to create and embed political                           
violence into the Yemeni context. As with Iraq and Libya, for example, supporting authoritarian                           
leadership flexible to UK and US companies in favour of ‘anti-British’ secular nationalist movements                           
shaped the structural preconditions for motivating and enabling political violence. A grasp of the pursuit                             
of these twin objectives, then, are critical to a deeper understanding of the cycles of violence in the                                   
Yemeni context.  
Neoliberal security governance: private over national interests 
Turning to the second question, how do these objectives further our understanding of Britain’s recent                             
involvement? These objectives cast light on the mode of governance which shapes Britain’s relations with                             
Yemen and Saudi Arabia. While often discussed in terms of upholding national security and prosperity,                             
UK-Saudi relations hinge on protecting Britain’s access to Saudi petroleum. As the UK’s Defence                           
Secretary notes, ‘the Middle East….is extremely important to both our security and our economy. We                             
also need to ensure that the energy supplies that we rely on are secure and that our trade routes are secure,                                         
and that is why we maintain a credible and persistent defence presence in the region’. In this sense,                                     
161
Britain’s twin policy objectives supersede an adherence to the national interest via upholding security and                             
158 Julian Assange, ‘The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to the US Empire’, p. 71 (Verso: 2015). Diplomatic cables show 
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opposition to the Saleh regime.  
159 Hill, p.6-7, 2017. As Hill notes, ‘In 2010, the Pentagon struck a deal with Saleh to increase military aid in return for Saleh’s 
permission to pursue an aggressive shadow war’; 
160 April Longley Alley, ‘Assessing (In) security after the Arab Spring: The Case of Yemen’. ​PS: Political Science and Politics​, 2013.  
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online at: 
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prosperity for the wider population.  
From the imperial past to the neoliberal present, the pursuit of these twin objectives meant little                               
attention was paid to promoting humanitarianism or reducing the likelihood of organised political                         
violence. As this chapter has shown, central to maintaining a political-economic environment favourable                         
to commercial enterprise is the relationship with Saudi Arabia. This raison d’être was shown to have been                                 
supported by several strategies which systematically undermined human welfare and helped to create                         
conditions under which violence emerged. As Mark Curtis observes, ‘noticeably absent from the                         
government’s planning record is anything about the concerns of the people of the region.… [nowhere                             
are] the interests or wishes of the inhabitants of the Middle East even considered, let alone a major factor                                     
in policy-making.’   
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Chapter Three 
The discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism 
 
Chapter two outlined the historical background against which the UK’s most recent involvement in                           
Yemen takes place. As discussed, the government maintains long-standing policy objectives aimed at                         
creating political and economic environments suitable for British private enterprise. As such, the                         
promotion of human welfare and reducing the likelihood of organised political violence had demonstrably                           
little influence on the governance of the region. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the discourses used                                 
by leading officials to represent the UK’s involvement in terms of humanitarianism and counterterrorism.                           
To do so, it will use a discourse-analytic approach to examine these two themes central to all statements                                   
made by officials. The central question asks, in what ways is Britain’s involvement in Yemen represented                               
by leading government officials?  
The first section will focus on the discourse of humanitarianism. This discourse has emerged                           
from the context of empire-building discussed earlier. Common to both historical moments is evidence of                             
war crimes and violations in human rights law, which encourages this critical scrutiny of appeals to                               
humanitarianism. The second section will turn to an analysis of the accompanying discourse of                           
counterterrorism.  
 
3.1 Humanitarianism and British values 
 
Benevolent Britain 
The first key feature of the discourse of humanitarianism is sustaining the view that Britain’s primary                               
concern is advancing human welfare in an unfolding crisis. This conventional view draws upon a                             
dominant understanding of ‘humanitarian’ which, since the humanitarian interventionism of the 1990s,                       
defines humanitarianism as ‘the impartial, independent and neutral provision of relief to those in                           
immediate danger of harm’. ​In key addresses, leading officials argue that Britain’s involvement is in                             
163
large part motivated by a ‘humanitarian crisis’. In this way, the existence of a crisis is proposed as a                                     
164
central justification. As such, officials consistently define Britain’s role in terms of its contribution                           
towards improving living standards in this ‘forgotten’ crisis. As the UK ambassador to the UN Security                               
165
Council briefing on Yemen frames Britain notes, ‘the United Kingdom calls…for the human rights of all                               
163 Michael Barnett, ‘Humanitarianism Transformed’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 3, no. 4. 2005 ​in ​Eleanor Davey, ‘A History of 
the Humanitarian System: Western origins and foundations’, Humanitarian Policy Group. 2013.  
164 Over 60 per-cent of addresses note the ‘humanitarian crisis’ in Yemen.  
165 Priti Patel, ‘Priti Patel drives new international action to tackle the forgotten humanitarian crisis in Yemen’, 2016. Available 
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Yemenis to be respected.’ This humanitarian posture is expressed as a wider objective of foreign policy,                               
166
as David Cameron notes: ‘we want an active foreign policy that is staunch in its support for democracy                                   
and human rights’.   
167
Underlying this discursive feature is the assumption that Britain’s involvement in Yemen and its                           
wider foreign policy is benevolent. This is presupposed in the use of moral sentiments through which                               
officials express a humanitarian governmental response to the ‘crisis’. For instance, Boris Johnson refers                           
to ‘our concern for the unspeakable suffering [and] human tragedy’ in Yemen. This speaks to Britain’s                               
168
‘moral authority’ to which Cameron refers. In addressing the ‘forgotten crisis that demands action’, Priti                             
169
Patel follows a broad pattern of asserting the government’s moral authority: ‘we cannot and will not stand                                 
back in silence whilst innocent people are suffering’. This ethical position motivates Britain’s response,                           
170
as ‘there is an urgent need to find a solution that will restore peace for the people of Yemen’. Indeed,                                       
171
the success of this humanitarian response is often reiterated. As Mathew Rycroft asserts, ‘i​n both 2015                               
and 2016, we helped more than a million Yemenis with food, medical supplies and clean water.’  
172
Predicated on Britain’s benevolence, the humanitarian discourse purports that the purpose of                       
UK’s involvement is to ensure the development of Yemeni civil society. Defined as such, officials present                               
Britain as inherently good. For example, as Minister for International Development Alan Duncan claims,                           
‘what we are interested in doing is tackling the challenges of poverty, disease and education in Yemen.’                                 
173
In ‘addressing instability’, the UK’s involvement makes possible the prospect that ‘Yemen can hold                           
together and prosper’. In this sense, Britain holds both the intentions and resources necessary to                             
174
address a crisis to which it has no relation in creating.  
On the level of narrative, officials situate Britain as a civilising force in a meta-narrative about an                                 
interaction between civilisation and barbarism. As Jackson argues, meta-narratives are grand stories which                         
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persist through time and are often embedded within a wide range of institutions and practices. Often                               
175
used to describe development and security practices, this narrative casts light on how the discourses of                               
humanitarianism and counter-terrorism overlap. Announcing a project to protect Yemen’s cultural                     
heritage sites, Ambassador Jonathan Allen notes, ‘civilisation, education, and our shared cultural heritage                         
will prevail over destruction, barbarism, and the division of terrorists.’ While utterances about terrorism                           
176
are often couched in this narrative ​, it is also frequently used to present British presence in foreign                                 
177
territories in terms of humanitarianism and moral intent. To be sure, civilisation and barbarism is deeply                               
rooted in Anglo-European political thought. The encounter with colonised people is consistently                       
178
represented in the liberal political tradition as a confrontation between civilisation and barbarism. As                           
liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill argues, while ‘colonies of European race’ were entitled to                           
self-government, ‘despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the                           
end be their improvement’. Under this view, colonial authority and political-economic domination is a                           
179
form of benevolent tutelage. Indeed, as chapter one showed, this view was resolutely upheld by colonial                               
180
officers and policy planners. Furthermore, as Edward Said details, this system of language used to                             
represent a barbaric Orient functioned to legitimate practices which extend beyond the colonial era into                             
twenty-first century interventions. From ‘saving Afghan women’ through invasion, to liberating                     
181
citizenries in ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and ‘Operation Restoring Hope’ in Yemen, governments in the                           
global North consistently frame and justify military intervention through a human rights discourses. As                           
Lila Abu-Lughod puts it, such justifications resonate with the colonial language of superiority. In doing                             
182
so, officials make an appeal to a historical narrative, bound up with national identity, about the liberal                                 
political tradition to promote human well-being. 
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British values & historical mythology 
The representation of Britain as a humanitarian actor in Yemen hinges on an appeal to the concept of                                   
‘British values’. Similarly employed in the national security governance agenda , this appeal is the second                             
183
important feature of the discourse of humanitarianism. Officials present the government’s involvement in                         
Yemen as an expression of values embedded in the notion of Britain. Nationhood and national identity,                               
as William Wallace argues, are ‘necessary myths which underpin foreign policy’. These myths are of                             
particular importance if foreign policy is represented in terms of national identity itself. In Wallace’s                             
words, they are about ‘the sources of national pride, the characteristics which distinguish a country from                               
its neighbours… the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad’. The framing of foreign policy                                 
184
through national identity is exemplified in Theresa May’s assertion that, ‘perhaps above all we have that                               
defining British spirit - and the fundamental values of fairness, justice and human rights – to use our                                   
influence in the world for good’. Within this frame, the government’s role in Yemen is characterised by                                 
185
humanitarian values proposed as inherent to the British nation-state. Accordingly, Britain is presented as                           
an inherently good and legitimate source of authority. 
To reinforce this view, officials frequently make appeals to history. This third discursive feature                           
speaks to the ways in which involvement in Yemen is embedded in a narrative about Britain’s history as a                                     
benevolent international actor. In a discourse-historical study, Graham et al argue that appeals to history                             
are common to a number of ‘call to arms’ speeches in which leaders seek to mobilise a constituency by                                     
drawing connections between past and present-day military activities. In this sense, the appeal to history                             
186
could also be understood as a rhetorical device: a technique used to convey meaning with a view to                                   
persuade.  
The appeal to history holds two key implications. First, that British values have historically                           
motivated progress and civilisation. As a logical consequence, Britain’s involvement in Yemen follows this                           
fact of history. Second, that the humanitarian crisis to which Britain is responding is unrelated to imperial                                 
history and support for the airstrikes and blockade.  
To analyse the first implication, it is useful to draw from CDA’s methodological framework to                             
ask the following question of the statement below: what are the histories and embedded meanings of the                                 
important words in the texts? David Cameron’s historical appeal highlights the importance of ‘British                           
values’ by describing them as: ‘national values that swept slavery from the seas, that stood up to both                                   
fascism and communism and that helped to spread democracy and human rights around the planet – that                                 
will drive us to do good around the world’. Under Cameron’s view, British values are a set of historically                                     
183 For the use of ‘British values’ in the national Prevent strategy, see: Arun Kundnani, ‘A Decade Lost: Re-thinking 
Radicalisation and Extremism’. Claystone. 2015.  
184 William Wallace, ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom’. International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 1. pp. 65-80. (Oxford University Press: 1991) 
185 Theresa May, ‘The Prime Minister’s speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet’, 2017. Available online at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017 
186 Graham et al, 2004. 
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persistent, inherent principles that ‘drive’ civilisational progress. In other words, national values are the                           
primary explanatory force underlying positive social change. Driven by these values, Britain’s involvement                         
in Yemen is bound to promote human welfare. In this sense, Britain’s involvement is legitimated by virtue                                 
of its inherent liberal values.  
The second implication relates to obscuring the evolution of the crisis to which Britain is                             
responding. The appeal to history isolates the humanitarian crisis from Britain’s imperial history with                           
Yemen as well as its support for an operation which creates the crisis itself. With respect to the former,                                     
none of the 497 statements on Yemen situate Anglo-Yemeni relations in any historical context (Chapter                             
Two). Specifically, there are no recorded statements relating to Britain’s use and sponsoring of violence                             
from the conquest of Aden through to the covert war in the 1960s. This helps to legitimate policy                                   
practices by obscuring Britain’s long-standing commercial and geostrategic objectives in Yemen. Rather,                       
Cameron’s positive representation of Britain’s imperial past naturalises the government’s role as a                         
humanitarian actor. For this reason, the appeal to history constitutes a historical mythology which omits                             
institutionalised ideas and practices. This follows a general pattern in official statements which overlook                           
foreign policy practices which, far from ‘sweeping slavery from the seas’, fuelled the transatlantic slave                             
trade, have systematised violence against colonised people, and violated international law in the pursuit of                             
geostrategic and commercial objectives stated earlier . In this sense, the construction of a historical                           
187
mythology divorces the violence and instability in Yemen from the colonial and contemporary practices                           
from which it has emerged. In light of this historical background, the stated concern for humanitarianism                               
appears less stable.  
Moreover, the appeal prizes apart Britain’s support for the campaign from the crisis to which the                               
government is responding. Similarly formed in an obscured imperial context, UK-Saudi relations have                         
prompted the decline in humanitarian conditions through aerial bombing and a comprehensive blockade.                         
However, officials omit the UK and Saudi’s role in directly causing violence and destabilising the                             
socio-political context. For example, William Hague externalises Britain’s role by referring to ‘Yemeni                         
people who are suffering…in ​a region which has ​seen [emphasis added] huge instability and violence’.                             
188
Under such a view, the aerial bombing campaign has no bearing on human suffering. As such, officials                                 
are able to express moral indignation about violence in Yemen while maintaining air-strikes and the                             
blockade. For instance, William Hague states: ‘I am appalled by the reports of yet more deaths in Sana’a. I                                     
187 The National Archives, ‘Britain and the Slave Trade,’ 2015. Between 1640-1807, Britain transported 3.1 million Africans to 
British colonies; Available online at: ​http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/slavery/pdf/britain-and-the-trade.pdf​; An illustrative 
case in this regard is the Mau Mau uprising, for an account of Britain’s suppression of the 1952 Mau Mau uprising in 1952, during 
which 1.5 million Kenyans were forced into a network of prison camps, see: Carole Elkins, ‘Imperial Reckoning: The Untold 
Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya’. 2005. For a full account, see: Mark Curtis, ‘Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses’. 
(Random House: 2004).  
188 William Hague, ‘Foreign Secretary condemns bombings in Yemen’, 2013. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-suicide-bombings-in-yemen 
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absolutely condemn this latest violence.’ In this sense, officials follow a general principle in                           
189
Anglo-American political discourse, which Jackson argues ‘has always sought to portray its motives as                           
being free from self-interest or the realpolitik of foreign policy’.  
190
 
Discursive practice: block(aid) 
This section will turn to the institutional practices normalised through this discourse. As shown, officials                             
argue that Britain’s involvement is motivated by an unfolding humanitarian crisis. ​This rests on the claim                               
that Britain is a key donor of humanitarian aid to Yemen. As such, ​the practice of providing aid is                                     
normalised as a solution to the crisis co-created by British arms sales that far outstrip aid donations.                                 191
Reinforced by the humanitarian discourse, this institutional practice is built on the idea that the                             
government serves a benevolent purpose. This discursive practice is clear in claims made by the                             
government’s institution for aid provision about providing Yemeni civilians with life-saving treatments                       
with no recognition of the conditions under which their demand has sharply increased.   192
In turn, the practice of arms licensing to the coalition is normalised by an appeal to the discourse                                   
of humanitarianism. David Cameron sums up this militarised humanitarianism with the claim that ‘​our                           
military can support enormous humanitarian efforts.’ ​In one sense, officials justify support for Saudi                           
193
Arabia on the basis of a concern for Houthi-led aggression. Another humanitarian-centred justification,                         
government officials argue that Yemeni civilians require protection from Houthi rebels and Al-Qaeda.                         
Both arguments rest on the claim that Britain’s involvement is motivated by values which serve the                               
national interest.  
Second, the framing of Yemen as a ‘humanitarian crisis’ proposes that it is a natural disaster                               
rather than the result of military aggression for geostrategic ends. The crisis is discursively constructed as                               
the product of uncontrollable forces. Normalised practice is discursively prized apart from the key                           
structural explanation for the humanitarian conditions. According to the UN, the famine is ‘an entirely                             
man made catastrophe’. For this reason, the UN World Food Programme’s position is that that Saudi                               
194
189 William Hague, ‘Foreign Secretary "appalled" at situation in Yemen’, 2011. Available online at: 
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190 Richard Jackson, ‘Writing Wars on Terrorism: The Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush 
Jr.’, In Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Annual Conference, p. 13, 2011.  
191 Anna Stavrianakis, ‘History won’t look kindly on Britain overarms sales feeding war in Yemen’. The Guardian, 2018. Available 
online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/nov/30/history-will-not-look-kindly-on-britain-over-arms-sales-feedi
ng-war-in-yemen 
192 Department for International Development, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2017-18’. 2018. Available online at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/750989/DFID-Annual-Re
port-Accounts-2017-18-amended-Oct18.pdf 
193 David Cameron, 2014. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-the-un-general-assembly-2014 
194 The Guardian, ‘Manmade catastrophe’: Yemen conflict has killed 1,100 children, says UN.’ 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/05/man-made-catastrophe-yemen-conflict-has-killed-1100-childr
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Arabia ought to fund ‘a hundred per-cent of the humanitarian needs’. The coalition’s human rights                             
195
violations and targeting of civilian infrastructure is the decisive determinant for the crisis to which                             
UKAID is responding.  
However, underlying key statements is the view that starvation is an existential threat to the                             
population, detached entirely from the coalition’s military blockade or air-strikes. Through the                       
obfuscation of agency , the government’s relation and responsibility for the man-made famine dissolves.                         
196
To do so, officials widely employ the mechanism of ‘passivisation’ . The use of the passive form                               
197
constructs the famine as unrelated from the practice of blockading major ports. For example, Justine                             
Greening states that ‘millions ​face starvation in Yemen.’ [emphasis added] As Martha Mundy argues, in                             
198
practice, the coalition and the UK government’s strategy to enforce a blockade is a ‘food war’ aimed at                                   
destroying production and inhibiting distribution. An economic dimension to the operation, sealing off                         
the country is the major cause for the wide-scale starvation. In international law, the starvation of civilians                                 
and the targeting of agricultural production lines violate Article 54 of the Geneva Convention and UNSC                               
resolution 2417. As such, obfuscating agency is a primary means through which the gap between                             
199
discourse and practice is mediated.   
Elsewhere, Theresa May disconnects the link between Britain’s support for the blockade and                         
consequent famine. An announcement on May’s talks with King Salman notes that ‘they discussed                           
Yemen, where the PM made clear that the flow of commercial supplies on which the country depends                                 
must be resumed ​if [emphasis added] we are to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.’ In these instances,                               
200
agency and responsibility are obscured through a specific grammatical choices and participant types.                         
May’s use of the italicised conditional attempts to convey the idea that Britain’s primary concern is                               
averting a crisis to which its actions have not contributed. This view holds that the government is                                 
applying diplomatic pressure to Saudi Arabia, while actual practice indicates the contrary.   
In this way, officials represent Britain as a humanitarian bystander amongst widespread famine                         
and cyclical violence. Through discursive sleight of hand, officials prize apart the shortages of food and                               
medicine from the coalition’s blockade. Under the ‘food war’ legitimated by the discourse of                           
humanitarianism, the population are actively being starved. As Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell notes,                         
‘​the Yemenis are not starving: they are being starved by a blockade in which we are complicit.’   
201
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3.2 Counterterrorism and (in) the national interest 
 
As shown, central to representation of the UK in Yemen is a discourse of humanitarianism. This section                                 
will critically analyse the closely linked discourse of counterterrorism. It will be shown how this discourse                               
situates ‘humanitarian’ Britain in a battle against an ‘evil’ terrorist threat. As a result of these discursive                                 
features, it is shown how the practice of aerial bombing is normalised as a militarised response to threat of                                     
terrorism according to the national interest. Defined by claims about increasing national security and                           
prosperity, this concept will then form the centre of the following chapter’s analysis.   
 
The international terrorist threat 
The first key feature of the discourse of counterterrorism is the language of ‘threat’. Broadly, the language                                 
of an imminent terrorist threat is central to contemporary security governance. In the case of Yemen,                               
202
underlying government statements is the assumption that terrorism poses an existential threat to regional                           
and international security. This is evident in David Cameron’s announcement that ‘I believe this is the                               
most important global threat to our security.’ Through repetition of this claim, government officials                           
203
situate a ‘threat we all face’ in the Yemeni context. As David Cameron puts it elsewhere, the ‘threat                                   
204
from Islamic extremism, from Al Qaeda, requires a pretty close focus on Yemen’.   
205
Not only is the threat level claimed to be ever-increasing, but terrorism is argued to be ‘a threat                                   
both within Yemen and internationally’ . As such, this internationalised threat is positioned at the                           
206
forefront of the international community’s security agenda. That ‘we cannot ignore the threat to all our                               
countries from international terrorism’ expresses a need for an urgent and collective response. Indeed,                           
207
as Matthew Rycroft contends, ‘countering such terrorist threats must remain a top priority for this                             
Council and the international community as a whole’.   
208
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Between good and evil 
 
Between 2011-2017, officials cited ‘evil’ in 291 separate announcements. Almost all related to terrorism.                           
209
Cameron states that in strict opposition to Britain’s cause of ‘freedom, democracy and justice’ exists ‘an                               
evil against which the whole world should unite’. In Theresa May’s words, to ‘defeat terrorism’ involves                               
210
a ‘fight against [its] evil influence’. In this sense, officials follow a historical pattern of many ‘call to                                   
211
arms’ speeches in which the construction of a thoroughly evil Other is essential to mobilising public                               
support. Using this narrative simplifies the enemy’s violence as irrational and inherently evil. This holds                             
212
two important implications: the first relates to how narratives help to construct meaning, the second                             
concerns the way in which this narrative helps to conceive of responses to the terrorist threat. 
In large part, narratives in political discourse are important because of the ways in which they                               
help construct and convey meaning. The ‘good versus evil’ narrative holds that terrorist violence                           
213
emerges from inherent evil. For Cameron, the so-called Islamic State are an ‘evil death cult’. As such,                                 
214
officials propose that terrorism ought to be viewed independently of the specific context from which it                               
emerges. The narrative presupposes that structural explanations for political violence, such as historical                         
215
and socio-political conditions, are irrelevant to a full understanding of terrorism. However, political                         
violence does not emerge from a socio-political and historical vacuum. As Chapter One notes, cycles of                               
216
violence have emerged from a context in which state and non-state actors used violence to pursue                               
political interests. Crucially, non-state actors have done so in a context de-stabilised by the powerful states                               
pursuing political-economic interests. Nevertheless, using the de-contextualising language of inherent evil                     
inhibits a nuanced understanding of a complex socio-political phenomenon. Central to a deeper                         
understanding of this violence, and shaping ways to undermine it, is a firm grasp of this context. This                                   
highlights an internal inconsistency at the heart of the counterterrorism discourse, discussed in the                           
following chapter.  
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The second implication relates to the way in which narratives help to conceive appropriate                           
responses to the terrorist threat. Under this narrative, the primary motivation for terrorism is evil. Since                               
evil is an inherent property, an effective response to terrorism is military action. The narrative animates an                                 
idea found within debates in international relations that evil is an attribute of foes which needs to be                                   
eradicated. In large part, this vocabulary helps to re-frame the humanity of perpetrators of political                             
217
violence. To this end, officials draw upon the language of disease. For example, David Cameron frames                               
counterterrorism as a way to ‘cut out the terrorist cancer which lurks in the Arabian Peninsula’ . This                                 
218
language tends to rationalise a ​military response to ​political violence. In this way, counterterrorism is                             
constructed according to a logic internal to the so-called war on terror; that ‘precision guided bombs’ and                                 
‘surgical’ military strikes are an effective counter-weight to armed resistance against military                       
interventionism.    
219
 
Discursive practice: militarism in the national interest 
Overarching the discourse of counterterrorism is the argument that responses to terrorism are motivated                           
by the national interest. According to Cameron, ‘​our national interest is easily defined.  It is to ensure our                                   
future prosperity and to keep our country safe in the years ahead.’ Here, ​the national interest is made up                                     
220
of claims about promoting national security and prosperity – the pillars on which Anglo-Saudi relations                             
are allegedly based. Under the discourse of counterterrorism, the appeal to the national interest holds that                               
Britain’s support for Saudi Arabia is a benefit to security and prosperity. The link between                             
counterterrorism in Yemen and the national interest via national security is drawn on both national and                               
international lines. In Cameron’s words, ‘the reason we have the relationship is our own national security.’                             
Following a coalition bombing of a school bus in Yemen, Jeremy Hunt’s defence of the UK’s                                 
221
continued support for the coalition was the argument that it ‘means that we stop bombs going off on the                                     
streets of Britain.’   
222
Here, defence exports to Saudi Arabia satisfy both national security and prosperity, and therefore                           
serve the national interest. In terms of security, the practice of arms sales protects ‘British streets’ and the                                   
‘international community’ from the threat of Yemeni terror. Building on the discourse of                         
humanitarianism, this practice is widely framed in moral terms. As Cameron puts it, ‘it is right to help                                   
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those on the frontline…against Al Qaeda in Yemen’. In another sense, this moral obligation is                             
223
reinforced by Cameron’s claim that Britain’s military support is insufficient, noting that ‘we should do                             
more’. This would involve ‘training, equipping, and advising…providing technology and the other assets                         
necessary for success.’ This argument for continued military support is based on the assumption that                             
224
terrorist violence is reduced by building the ‘capacity of legitimate authorities fighting the extremists’.                           
Under such a view, Saudi Arabia and other importers of British military assistance and equipment are                               
these legitimate authorities. As such, arms sales are a necessary part of achieving the goal of a ‘more                                   
permanent and enduring commitment to the long-term security of the Gulf…a special market for the                             
UK’.  
225
As a result, increasing arms exports and military bases are normalised and legitimated. The next                             
chapter will evaluate the veracity of the claims about national security and prosperity, and shows the lack                                 
of evidence for the broader appeal to the national interest. Rather, it will be shown that this commercial                                   
foreign policy is shaped and most directly benefits commercial enterprise, rather than the wider                           
population. Indeed, as Cameron notes, Britain’s security governance involves ‘placing our commercial                       
interests at the heart of our foreign policy’.   
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Chapter Four 
Neoliberal security governance: private versus public interests 
 
It has been shown that a discourse of humanitarianism and counterterrorism shape the government’s                           
discursive representation of its role in Yemen. This final chapter involves a discussion on the broader                               
mode of governance in which the governance of Yemen takes shape. To do so, it will explore how                                   
Britain’s involvement can be better understood in terms of neoliberal governance. It focuses on the                             
following questions: does the government’s involvement in Yemen fulfil its stated objectives to improve                           
national security and prosperity? And, in whose interests does this mode of governance operate? The                             
central argument is that Britain’s involvement in Yemen is characterised by neoliberal governance, under                           
which an elite constituency is prioritised under the guise of the national interest. In short, security and                                 
prosperity are afforded to this constituency rather than to civil society.  
This is discussed in three parts. First, it is shown that the appeal to the national interest, which                                   
partly argues that Britain’s involvement benefits national security, is inconsistent with practices shown to                           
empower and serve as a ‘recruiting sergeant’ for violent organisations. Next, using quantitative trade data,                             
it is shown that the argument for economic prosperity under the appeal to the national interest also lacks                                   
justificatory force. The third part highlights the specific beneficiaries of the political choices behind the                             
security governance in the context of Yemen. Here, it is argued that this is symptomatic of a                                 
political-economic order under which a minority corporate-state nexus governs at the expense of the                           
wider population.  
 
Unpacking the national interest: appeal to security 
Under the discourse of humanitarianism, the government’s support for the coalition is motivated by a                             
humanitarian crisis which it has no hand in creating. Motivated as such, officials posit that the                               
government’s response resides in its comprehensive aid provision. Not only does this fulfil a                           
humanitarian end in itself, it also satisfies a key tenet of the national interest. Specifically, it improves                                 
national security, since improving living conditions inhibits terrorist organisations from committing                     
violence and rebel groups from threatening energy security. However, upon closer inspection, this appeal                           
to the national interest through claims about national security is inconsistent with actual practice.  
For example, in 2015 and 2016, the UK government approved £1.6 billion worth of arms sales                               
and contributed £130 million towards humanitarian aid. More broadly, EU governments approved                       
$86.7bn worth of arms sales - fifty-five times the total donations to the UN’s Yemen Humanitarian Crisis                                 
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Response Plan. These figures highlight the limited influence of aid on the security situation while                             
227
thirty-three percent of airstrikes hit civilian targets. ​These strikes have included four ​Médecins ​Sans                          
Frontières ​hospitals (visible from air), schools, markets, weddings and school buses. ​As Helen Lackner                          228
argues, the ‘contradiction between aid to alleviate the consequences of bombing and financing the                           
bombing itself is something which the UK government fails to address’. Elsewhere, Conservative MP                           
Andrew Mitchell argues that ‘​it is hard to take seriously a humanitarian relief plan which is accompanied,                                 
night after night, by major bombing attacks from the Saudi air force which are killing innocent civilians.’                                 
The distribution of aid to arms highlights the government’s role as a military aggressor, rather than a                                   
229
humanitarian actor. From a national security perspective, this role serves to extend the conflict. ​Indeed,                             
the government’s official position is that a political solution is the only viable option to end the conflict                                   
and promote lasting peace. Moreover, much of the government’s involvement with the coalition has                           
230
been alleged to contravene international (humanitarian) law. Evidence of systematic violations of                       
international law include: targeting civilian infrastructure, approving licenses for illegal weapons, and                       
facilitating the use of torture. As recent history shows, such violations are likely to increase the appeal                                 
231
of the recruitment strategies employed by terrorist organisations and help to generate the conditions for                             
such groups to expand.   
232
Similarly, the government’s responses to the terrorist threat are inconsistent with the appeal to                           
security that underpins the discourse of counterterrorism. To effectively reduce the threat of terrorist                           
activity, two strategies are key. The first is to reduce the material and human capacities of terrorist groups.                                   
Part of the coalition’s central objective to weaken Houthi forces, however, involves supporting AQAP                           
militants against this common enemy. Put simply, successfully weakening the Houthis involves                       
233
227 Middle East Eye, ‘EU countries approve arms sales worth 55 times aid to UN’, 2018.  
228 According to the Yemen Data Project, one in three Saudi air raids on Yemen hit civilian sites. This includes: 942 attacks on 
residential areas, 114 on markets, 34 on mosques, 147 on school buildings, 26 on universities and 378 on transport. Available 
online at: ​https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/16/third-of-saudi-airstrikes-on-yemen-have-hit-civilian-sites-data​; see 
Appendix A.   
229 This distribution is described by Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell as ‘giving someone a plaster after punching them in the 
face’. Available online at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-saudi-arabia-oxfam-aid-air-strikes-civilian-casualties-a8615081.
html  
230 House of Commons Library, Conflict in Yemen, 2017, Number CDP 2017-0108, 2017.  
231 Amnesty International, ‘Exposed: British-made cluster bombs used on civilian targets in Yemen’. 2018. Available online at: 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/exposed-british-made-bombs-used-civilian-targets-yemen​; Reuters, ‘Senators demand investigation 
of reports of torture in Yemen,’ 2017. Available online at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-prisons-usa-congress/senators-demand-investigation-of-reports-of-torture-in-yemen
-idUSKBN19E2GZ   
232 Douglas A. Johnson, Alberto Mora, and Averell Schmidt, ‘The Strategic Cost of Torture: How “Enhanced Interrogation” 
Hurt America’, University of Pennsylvania Law School, pp.122-131, 2016. This argument is well understood amongst 
policy-makers. As the authors note, ‘according to State Department cables…the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib…was 
the ‘single most important motivating factor’ in persuading foreign jihadists to join the war’.  
233 Al Jazeera, ‘Saudi-UAE coalition 'cut deals' with al-Qaeda in Yemen’, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/report-saudi-uae-coalition-cut-deals-al-qaeda-yemen-180806074659521.html​. 2018; 
Andrew Byers and Faith Stewart, ‘Yemen – An Inescapable Disaster. Why the United States Should Avoid Military Intervention’, 
Small Wars Journal ​, 2018.  
46 
 
empowering AQAP. The second strategy is the most crucial according to existing evidence on the ways                               
234
to de-escalate political violence. Namely, to minimise the set of socio-political preconditions which                         
encourage and motivate individuals to engage in organised political violence. As former Yemeni                         
government official Rafat al-Akhali and former CIA official Bruce Riedel argue, the only local winners of                               
a conflict prolonged by coalition forces are terrorist organisations. In mainstream terrorism literature,                         
235
studies show that ‘geopolitical grievances’ formed by UK/US-led foreign invasions in the Middle East are                             
the primary explanation for individuals to engage in political violence at home or abroad. ​Put simply,                               
236
terrorist organisations seek to mobilise a constituency according a set of socio-political grievances. As                           
local sources highlight, the coalition’s air-strikes and the blockade foster these grievances and tend to                             
support, rather than inhibit, the passage to organised political violence. These policies have helped to                             
237
create the conditions under which AQAP successfully recruit civilians for militancy.   
238
Appeal to prosperity 
These inconsistencies undermine the claims about national security in both discourses. The second                         
feature of the appeal to the national interest is the argument that the government’s involvement benefits                               
national prosperity. As the Minister for Business, Investment and Skills argues, ‘defence exports are good                             
for Britain and good for the people of Britain’. What is the veracity of the claim that arms sales benefit                                       
239
the national interest via the economy? Recent findings show that there are limited benefits to the                               
population’s prosperity.   
Under the discourse of counterterrorism, officials note the importance of a ‘commercial foreign                         
policy’ for which Saudi Arabia are key. The prosperity argument holds that the trading relationship with                               
240
Saudi Arabia benefits the national economy. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Rather,                               
arms exports create prosperity for a minority group of shareholders in defence companies at the                             
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economic expense of the UK population. First, this is evident in UK-Saudi bilateral trading figures. In                               
2016, Saudi imports were 0.3 per cent of the UK’s total, while exports to Saudi Arabia were worth one                                     
per cent of the UK’s total export value. In terms of exports, the sale of £6bn worth of                                   
241
British-manufactured military equipment would appear to be advantageous to the balance of trade.                         
However, the economic benefits to the UK population are minimal. The Treasury received just £30m                             
from arms sales of a total annual return of £700bn. As such, arms sales made up 0.004% of total                                     
242
revenue to the Treasury.   
243
Under the appeal to prosperity, officials make two further unsupported claims. Namely, that                         
(arms) trading relations with Saudi will secure increased revenue from corporation tax, and that the arms                               
industry benefits the UK’s industrial employment base. On the issue of corporation tax, a War Child                               
investigation concludes: ‘​weapons sales to Saudi Arabia generated £13m in corporation tax in 2016, yet                             
during 2017, the UK will spend £139m in humanitarian aid to Yemen. This means the Treasury spends                               
over four times in aid what it gets back in tax.’ As for benefits to the wider population, tax revenue                                       
244
amounts to approximately 45 pence per UK citizen towards public services. ​Meanwhile, arms sales                           
generated £600m in profits between March 2015-December 2016. As such, according to a key feature of                               
neoliberal governance, prosperity is transferred from the population towards a minority group of                         
shareholders within private enterprise. ​Rather than having ‘faith in open markets and fair competition’ ,                           
245
the British public subsidises and protects an elite group of shareholders in the defence industry. For                               
instance, the government provides approximately £104-142 million in public subsidies to the arms                         
industry. ​Through government contracts, the UK population subsidises defence companies which take                       
246
over the UK’s obligations in government-to-government deals. As such, every citizen contributes an                         
247
annual £64 to defence company BAE Systems. As for the employment argument, while BAE registered                             
248
record profits, the company implemented an austerity programme which cut 2,000 industrial jobs.   
249
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Private over public, profit over people 
With the appeal to the national interest undermined, this section turns to the question: to whose benefit                                 
are the political choices behind the governance of Yemen?  
The government’s involvement in Yemen is symptomatic of a wider political-economic mode of                         
governance under which the security and prosperity of a minority group is prioritised over the wider                               
population. N​eoliberal governance promotes a transferal of public wealth towards corporations to the                         
detriment of both Yemeni and UK civil society. ​This process involves a hallmark of neoliberal                             
governance: the socialisation of risk and the privatisation of profit. Under neoliberal governance,                         
250
corporations such as BAE Systems are heavily subsidised and profits are retained amongst a few private                               
shareholders. In contradiction to actual free-market principles, this is characteristic of a broader mode of                             
governance which makes both British and Yemeni civil society less secure and prosperous.  
As the (unsupported) appeal to the economy shows, neoliberal governance purports to govern                         
according to neutral, economic truths. Under this doctrine of economic neutrality, social policy is                           
presented as independent of political or ideological choice. However, upon closer inspection, each                         
251
sector of public life has been governed according to a defining feature of neoliberalism to transfer wealth                                 
and political influence away from the public towards the corporate sector. In security governance, the                             
subsidised arms industry has generated greater insecurity and provided little economic benefit to the UK                             
citizenry. As for the government’s concern with the national economy, neoliberal governance has                         
underpinned austerity programmes and tax breaks for higher income earners. These non-neutral policy                         
decisions have suppressed real GDP by £100bn, with every citizen £1,495 worse off since 2010. As a                                 
252
UN study finds, austerity programmes were an explicit social policy geared towards an upwards transferal                             
of wealth that have left a fifth of the population living in poverty. From a legal-ethical perspective,                                 
253
policies legitimated under this mode of governance not only violate international law in Yemen, but on a                                 
national level, has deep ‘inconsistencies with Britain’s basic human rights obligations’. With the third                           
254
theoretical commitment to mind, the UN also finds that such policies ‘could be changed overnight with                               
very little money’.  
255
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Far from serving any meaningful (inter)national interests, Britain’s political-economic system of                     
governance largely seeks to maintain its influence in key strategic territories and retain international                           
power. In its ‘International Defence Engagement Strategy’, for example, officials consistently refer to the                           
‘government’s vision for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom with a global reach and influence.’                             
256
In the case of its involvement in Yemen, David Wearing argues that the importance of Britain’s arms                                 
industry lies in its unique potential to satisfy the goal to maintain a status as a global military power.                                       
257
Accordingly, the government’s unwavering support for Saudi Arabia is primarily about the strategic value                           
of having an arms industry fit for a global military power. An interlinked corporate and state sector under                                   
neoliberalism governance supports this central objective. The most recent iteration of this ambition is                           
258
the loosely defined concept of a ‘Global Britain’. Under this banner, officials highlight overarching                           
‘strategic foreign policy objectives… to protect our people, project our influence and promote our                           
prosperity.’ Contrary to the appeal to the national interest considered here, the government maintains                             
259
its systemic involvement in arms trading and Middle East conflicts to maintain international power                           
through serving a minority of corporate, rather than national, interests. As such, it is crucial to view the                                   
government’s involvement in the context of a neoliberal mode of governance characterised by prioritising                           
elite economic interests at the expense of the wider population’s security and prosperity.   
260
Concluding remarks 
This thesis has pursued three central arguments. First, that Anglo-Yemeni relations could be characterised                           
by two interlinked political-economic objectives rooted in British colonial governance. Namely, the twin                         
objectives to shape a political environment favourable for the advancement of British companies. Second,                           
it was argued that officials employ discourses which represent the government’s involvement in terms of                             
solving a humanitarian crisis and countering terrorism. In so doing, officials cast Britain as a humanitarian                               
actor in a conflict between good and evil. It was shown how these discursive choices accompany and                                 
legitimate the performance of practices (i.e. blockade and aerial bombing) which sharply contrast with                           
stated objectives. In this sense, ​the discourses of humanitarianism and counterterrorism help to legitimate                           
the performance of practices which support structural violence and human suffering. ​Third, ​it was argued                             
that the government’s discourse and practices rely on an unsupported appeal to the national interest. To                               
do so, it was shown that the widely used appeals to national prosperity and security are not sound. Rather                                     
than benefit the economy, existing practice supports an upward transferal of wealth and encases itself                             
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however, could state clearly what the Global Britain policy entailed in practice.’ Available online at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/780/780.pdf​ - 
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against democratic oversight. Far from benefitting (inter)national security, the government’s practices                     
inflict violence and help to create the structural preconditions for involvement in organised political                           
violence. As such, Britain’s involvement in Yemen is more clearly understood as a part of a wider form of                                     
governance under which the prosperity and security of an elite constituency is prioritised over the wider                               
populations’. Britain’s involvement in Yemen speaks to a wider neoliberal characteristic to prioritise elite                           
interests at the expense of the security and prosperity of the wider population. As such, this thesis has                                   
provided an analysis of the process through which Britain’s practical involvement in Yemen is                           
systematised through discourse. Crucially, it has been shown how discourse accompanies practices which                         
help to support, rather than inhibit, both the violence and the humanitarian issues to which the                               
government responded.  
Nearly two decades into the so-called war on terror, both state and non-state violence has                             
swelled, alongside subsidised national defence budgets and profits for corporate shareholders. What, then,                         
are the prospects for a form of security governance that alleviates, rather than exacerbates, human                             
suffering? In light of allegations of international crimes, the coalition’s campaign has been subjected to                             
criticism from civil society groups and governments alike. The Saudi state-sponsored assassination of a                           
dissident journalist has brought further attention to Yemen. Indeed, the German government placed                         
261
bans on future arms sales and halted previously approved exports to Saudi Arabia. However,                           
262
Anglo-Saudi relations continue to thrive under the neoliberal order at the heart of the violence and                               
political-economic instability in Yemen and the wider Middle East.  
While this makes clear that actions can be taken to de-escalate conflict within the neoliberal                             
paradigm, it also highlights the need to further explore the ways in which neoliberalism is the beating                                 
heart of structural issues in the global economy, ecology, and civil society. As such, a post-neoliberal turn                                 
in political thought and practice is increasingly necessary to address these issues. Central to this endeavour                               
is gaining a deep understanding of the practices and their supporting discourses. Rearranging the way in                               
which Britain has conducted its international affairs involves restructuring the discourses that justify                         
practices that perpetuate these key issues. This involves recovering political power and democratic control                           
from small concentrations of wealth and power; a fact broadly identified and addressed through the                             
collective action of the growing international resistance directed against neoliberal governance. It is this                           
imaginative and collective response to neoliberalism that seeks to bring about a fuller range of                             
governmental practices which promote, rather than hinder, genuine security and prosperity for the                         
world’s population.   
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